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PART III 
Public Law 
CHAPTER 11 
Constitutional Law 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
§11.1. Introduction. The 1970 SuRVEY year saw an unusually large 
number of cases in which the constitutional validity of Massachusetts 
statutes and procedures was challenged in the federal courts either by 
way of collateral attacks upon state court convictions through federal 
habeas corpus proceedings or applications for injunctive andjor de-
claratory relief under federal civil rights legislation. 
§11.2. Obscenity law: State-federal friction. An index of this trend 
was noted in the 1969 SuRVEY with reference to litigation involving an 
allegedly obscene film entitled I am Curious (Yellow ).1 After the 
exhibitor had been convicted in the Superior Court for showing an 
obscene film, a three-judge United States district court, not questioning 
that the film was "legally obscene," issued a preliminary injunction 
against further prosecutions for exhibiting it to adults who were will-
ing to view it after being informed of the nature of its content.2 The 
United States Supreme Court stayed the enforcement order pending 
disposition of an appeal,a noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal,4 
and will likely decide the case during the 1971 SURVEY year.4a 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR., is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a 
member of the Bars of Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
§11.2. 11969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §10.2 at 210. 
2 Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969). 
3 Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U.S. 976 (1969). 
4 Byrne v. Karalexis, 397 U.S. 384 (1970), appeal docketed, No. 83, October Term, 
1970. The case was restored to the calendar for reargument, 399 U.S. 922 (1970). 
4a On February 23, 1971, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Byrne v. 
Karalexis, 39 U.S.L.W. 4236 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971). The Court held that the injunc-
tion issued by the three-judge district court was improper because there wa& no 
finding that the movie exhibitor's First Amendment rights could not be adequately 
protected in a single state criminal proceeding. In a per curiam opinion, the Court 
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The state and federal courts were brought close to direct conflict 
in the litigation over the musical stage production, Hair. The show 
contained scenes in which the players were nude and in which there 
was simulation of sexual intercourse or deviation. The producers sued 
for an injunction against threatened prosecutions for lewdness and 
lascivious behavior and for presenting an obscene show. The Supreme 
Judicial Court ruled that the show was not obscene, but it proceeded 
to predicate injunctive relief upon clothing all the players throughout 
the performance and elimination of all simulation of sexual intercourse 
or deviation.5 Unwilling to comply with those conditions, the producers 
applied for relief to the United States District Court for the District 
of Massachusetts. A three-judge court, one judge dissenting, ruled that 
the statute prohibiting lewdness and lascivious behavior6 and the com-
mon law prohibiting indecent exposure, as applied to the conduct of 
stage actors, were deficient for overbreadth, and that the threatened 
multiple prosecutions for separate portions of the presentation exerted 
an unacceptable "chilling effect" upon exercise of the First Amend-
ment right to present the show. An injunction was ordered forbidding 
prosecution under either the statute or the common law offense of 
indecent exposure.7 The majority opinion explained that if, instead 
of proceeding against the objectionable scenes in isolation, the prose-
cutor were able to establish that those scenes were so dominant or 
offensive as to pervade or distort the production as a whole, a charge 
under the obscenity statute might be maintained for production of 
the play itself. The United States Supreme Court declined to stay the 
injunction in this case.8 An appeal has been docketed,s and the case 
will likely be heard and decided at the 1970-1971 Term. 
Other cases arose involving clear-cut conflict between the Supreme 
Judicial Court and the lower federal courts. In the 1969 SuRVEY, ref-
erence was made to two obscenity cases tersely disposed of with the 
comment: "There was no error in the trial and convictions of the defen-
dants on complaints under G.L., ,c. 272, §28A. Judgments affirmed."lo 
As was also noted, the Supreme Court of the United States denied 
remanded the case for consideration in light of Younger v. Harris, 39 U.S.L.W. 
4201 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971), decided the satne day as Byrne v. Karalexis. That case 
held that a federal district court could not enjoin a state prosecution that did not 
involve harassment of the plaintiffs and the threat of great and irreparable harm 
that could not be eliminated in the state prosecution. 
5 P.B.I.C., Inc. v. District Attorney of Suffolk County, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 566, 
258 N.E.2d 82. 
6 G.L., c. 272, §16. 
7 P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mass. 1970). 
8 Byrne v. P.B.I.C., Inc., 398 U.S. 916 (1970). 
9 Byrne v. P.B.I.C., Inc., appeal docketed, No. 484, 39 U.S.L.W. 31!~6 (U.S. Aug. 1, 
1970). 
10 Commonwealth v. Calabrese, 355 Mass. 795, 245 N.E.2d 413 (1969); Common-
wealth v. Johnson, 255 Mass. 800, 247 N.E.2d 701 (1969), noted in 1969 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §10.2 at 208. 
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certiorari.ll Since jail sentences had been imposed, the prisoners 
sought federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241. Two petitions 
were filed, as affected prisoners were confined in different jails. Both 
were denied, but an opinion was reported in only one of the cases.12 
The report reveals that the prosecution was for sale of magazines fea-
turing photographs of nude young women "in poses and postures that 
center the attention of the viewer on the vulva and the surrounding 
area." The court found that they were obscene within the criteria set 
forth in Roth18 and Fanny Hill14- that, taken as a whole, they ap-
pealed to a prurient interest in sex, were patently offensive because 
they affronted contemporary community (national community) stan-
dards and were utterly without redeeming social value. 
The cases were heard together upon appeal, and the dismissals of 
the petitions for habeas corpus were reversed.15 The First Circuit Court 
of Appeals did not question the analytical findings made by the dis-
trict court. If anything, it underscored the fact that the conventionally 
described ingredients of legal obscenity were present in the publica-
tions involved in the prosecution. The court of appeals was shown, 
however, copies of magazines upon which the Supreme Court, in per 
curiam decisions16 based upon the per curiam decision in Redrup v. 
New York,n had summarily reversed state obscenity convictions. The 
court found these magazines indistinguishable in any relevant respect 
from those in the case before it and felt that the course of Supreme 
Court decisions had established that, as a matter of law, "no photo-
graph of the- female anatomy, no matter how posed if no sexual ac-
tivity is being engaged in, or however lacking in social value, can be 
held obscene." How the court arrives at the distinction between active 
and inactive photographic models is not explained. 
The Commonwealth has taken an appeal from this decision and 
the case is pending on the docket of the Supreme Court for its 1970-
1971 Term.1s It could be the vehicle for clarification of the widespread 
uncertainty of the present constitutionally permissible scope of state 
and federal laws dealing with obscenity. As frankly set forth in the 
per curiam opinion in Redrup v. New York, the Justices have long 
been unable to reach a consensus on the reasons for decision in various 
obscenity cases. Summary reversals and summary affirmances in this 
area have abounded, as have denials of certiorari. Sometimes summary 
11396 u.s. 990 (1969). 
12 Palladino v. McBrine, 310 F. Supp. 308 (D. Mass. 1970). 
13 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
14 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney 
General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
Hi Hunt v. Keriakos, 428 F.2d 606 (1st Cir. 1970). 
16 Central Magazine .Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); Bloss v. 
Dykema, 398 U.S. 278 (1970). 
17 386 u.s. 767 (1967). 
18 Keriakos v. Hunt, appeal docketed, No, 601, 39 U.S;L.W. 3084 (U.S. Aug. 26, 
1970). 
3
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action has evoked dissent indicating disagreement with the result on 
the merits, sometimes indicating preference for fuller consideration of 
the case. Denials of certiorari sometimes are accompanied by dissents 
calling for grant of review with summary reversal, sometimes by dis-
sents calling simply for full review. These actions and di!isents furnish 
no real basis for framing a pattern which would be helpful in pre-
dicting the reaction(s) of a majority of the Court to any given kind 
of obscenity problem.l9 
§11.3. Birth control: Eisenstadt v. Baird. Another case of conflict 
between the state and federal judiciaries grew out of the activities of 
William Baird, a self-appointed campaigner for extirpation of so-
called birth control laws. Baird was convicted in the Superior Court 
of giving a package of a contraceptive chemical to an unmarried 
woman. In response to a certified question, the Supreme Judicial 
Court ruled that, while Baird's exhibition of contraceptive devices 
during a lecture to university students was constitutionally protected 
by the First Amendment, the act of delivering such a device to one 
of his listeners was not so protected. The Court went on to rule that 
the statutory provision prohibiting delivery of such articles was valid 
as a measure for protection of the public health.l The conviction was 
affirmed by a 4 to 3 vote, and the United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.2 
In a subsequent case,3 the Supreme Judicial Court ruled, in a de-
claratory judgment proceeding brought by licensed physicians, that 
the same statute, again viewed as a health measure, validly prohibited 
the giving of contraceptive advice to unmarried women, although it 
is now permissible for physicians to give such advice to married women. 
The Court felt that the exception of married persons from the class 
to which the giving of such advice is forbidden is the necessary corol-
lary of Griswold v. Connecticut4 and the recognition therein of a 
constitutionally protected right of marital privacy. It was ruled that 
the exception did not change the basic character of the law as a health 
measure, as explicated in Baird. There were two dissents; Justice 
Whittemore, one of the Baird dissenters, had died. 
Baird proceeded to apply for federal habeas corpus relief. The dis-
trict court denied his petition,5 and appeal was taken to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. That court disagreed 
sharply with the Supreme Judicial Court.6 It expressed doubt that 
the statute was in reality one enacted in the interest of public health. 
19 See discussions in 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §8.5 and 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §10.2. 
§11.3. 1 Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 247 N.E.2d 574 (1969). 
2 Baird v. Massachusetts, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1029 (1970). 
3 Sturgis v. Attorney General, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1139, 260 N.E.2d 687. 
4 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
5 Baird v. Eisenstadt, 310 F. Supp. 951 (D. Mass. 1970). 
6 Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970). 
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However, even viewed as a health measure, the statute failed to meet 
the constitutional requisite of equal protection of the laws. The court 
could find no rational basis for separate classification of the married 
and the unmarried for purposes of applying the statutory prohibitions. 
Treating the statute as a regulation of public morality, the court con-
cluded that: 
To say that contraceptives are immoral as such, and are to be 
forbidden to unmarried persons who will nevertheless persist in 
having intercourse, means that such persons must risk for them-
selves an unwanted pregnancy, for the child, illegitimacy, and for 
society, a possible obligation of support. Such a view of morality 
is not only the very mirror image of sensible legislation; we con· 
sider that it conflicts with fundamental human rights. In the 
absence of demonstrated harm, we hold it is beyond the compe-
tency of the state. 7 
The court of appeals compared the statute, violation of which is 
felonious, with the fornication statute,s violation of which is a petty 
misdemeanor:· "We find it hard to believe that the legislature adopted 
a statute carrying a five-year penalty for its possible, obviously by no 
means fully effective, deterrence of the commission of a ninety-day 
misdemeanor."9 
A troublesome aspect of the case is the question of Baird's standing 
to raise the constitutional issues. The court indicated that somehow 
Baird had standing because he was in jail by reason of the statute 
and, almost by way of afterthought, pointed out that the Supreme 
Judicial Court had considered his presentation of the issues on the 
assumption that he had standing to raise them. In this respect, the 
case may be reminiscent of Tileston v. Ullman,1o in which an early 
attempt to challenge the Connecticut statutes dealing with traffic in 
contraceptives failed precisely because the protesting physicians lacked 
standing to complain of . the adverse impact of the laws upon their 
patients. The Commonwealth has filed an appeal from the instant 
decision, and that appeal is pending on the Supreme Court docket for 
the 1970-1971 Term.ll 
§11.4. Scope o£ federal habeas corpus: Fisher v. Scafati. Another 
point of divergence in state and federal judicial opinion is repre-
sented by the case of Fisher v. Scafati.1 The case involved application 
of the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona,2 namely, that a person in police 
7 Id. at 1402. 
s G.L., c. 272, §18. 
9 429 F .2d 1398, 1401 (1st Cir. 1970). 
10 !118 u.s. 44 (194!1). 
11 Eisenstadt v. Baird, appeal docketed, No. 804, !19 U.S.L.W. !1151 (U.S. Oct. 6, 
1970). 
§II.4. 1 !114 F. Supp. 929 (D. Mass. 1969). 
2 !184 u.s. 4!16 (1966). 
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custody must not be interrogated until and unless he has been given 
the fourfold warning that (I) he need not answer questi.ons, (2) any 
answers he gives may be used in evidence against him, (3) he is en-
titled to have counsel present, and (4) if he is upable to obtain counsel, 
a lawyer will be provided. 
Fisher was convicted of murder partly on the basis of statements 
he had made at the police station. At a pretrial hearing on a motion 
to suppress his statements, it appeared that, while the police were 
investigating the murder, they learned that Fisher had been at a party 
attended by the deceased; accordingly, he was invited to appear at 
the police station. There, Fisher was questioned generally about events 
on the evening in question, and, after some period of questioning, 
a police officer noticed scratches on the defendant's neck. The officer, 
then suspicious of Fisher's guilt, recited the Miranda warnings and, 
after a long interval (during which Fisher was transferred £rqm Spring-
field to Boston for lie-detector tests, then back to Springfield), the 
statements in question were made by the aa:used. The motion to sup-
press was overruled, the trial court finding that the Miranda warnings, 
given promptly when suspicion focused upon Fisher, were timely. 
Trial, conviction, and affirmance followed. 
Fisher then filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts. Initially, the district 
court found that the record in the state court did not adequately 
support the ruling of the trial judge on the motion to suppress evi-
dence, since it was made on the basis that the Miranda warnings were 
timely when given at the time when suspicion focused upon Fisher. 
This result, the court said, was apparently reached by way of applica-
tion of the distinct doctrine of Escobedo v. Illinois,a namely, that the 
right to the assistance of counsel is crystallized when the individual 
questioned becomes a suspect. Miranda requires that warnings be 
given when the individual is placed in police custody. Since the state 
court record did not make clear at what point Fisher's status changed 
from that of a voluntary visitor at the police station to that of one 
who would not have been allowed to leave had he tried (Fisher did 
not actually attempt to depart), the court ordered an evidentiary hear-
ing pursuant to Townsend v. Sain.4 
At the evidentiary hearing, it appeared that, well before the neck 
scratches on Fisher were noticed, the police realized that some of his 
statements were inconsistent with information they had received from 
other sources. This, while it did not arouse suspicion that Fisher was 
the murderer, caused the police to believe that he was probably con-
cealing information. The court concluded that Fisher would not have 
been allowed to leave the police station at least until the discrep-
3 378 u.s. 478 (1964). 
4 372 u.s. 293 (1963). 
6
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ancies in his statements had been clarified, and that failure to give the 
Miranda warnings at that time tainted the subsequent interrogation, 
including that portion made after the warnings had in fact been given. 
Accordingly, the court held that the record, as expanded in the federal 
court hearing, revealed that the motion to suppress should have been 
granted, and the conviction must be set aside. 
The significance of the case as an episode in federal-state judicial 
relations is somewhat complicated by the district court's doubts, gen-
erated at the evidentiary hearing, as to whether the police had actually 
given the full Miranda warnings, specifically whether they had ex-
plained to Fisher that he was entitled to have counsel furnished if he 
could not obtain an attorney himself. The case, however, is a striking 
illustration of the potential scope of federal habeas corpus proceedings 
in instances where it becomes appropriate for a federal court to look 
beyond the state court record. 
§11.5. Cases arising under the Massachusetts Constitution. During 
the 1970 SuRvEY year, several cases arose under various provisions of 
the Constitution of the Commonwealth, including a case in which, 
in substance, a provision of that constitution was itself held to be 
unconstitutional. 
Technically, Burg v. Canniffel arose under G.L., c. 51, §1, which 
provides that a registered voter must have lived in the Commonwealth 
for one year, and in the city or town for six months next preceding 
the election at which he desires to vote. Identical qualifications are 
set forth in Mass. Const. amend. art. III. That constitutional provi-
sion, however, was not immediately relevant to the instant case, as 
it is directed at qualification of voters in elections of state officers. 
Burg was refused registration for participation in a special election 
to fill a congressional seat because, although he had resided in the 
town of Marblehead for six months preceding the election, he had 
lived outside Massachusetts for at least part of the antecedent six 
months. 
A district court of three judges held that the statute- and the 
constitutional provision would logically seem subject to the same 
principle- unlawfully discriminated between persons who had lived 
in a town for six months after living outside Massachusetts and 
persons who had lived in the town for six months after living else-
where in Massachusetts. Reading recent decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court2 as mandates to regard any classification of voters as 
suspect unless the classification can be justified by a compelling state 
necessity, the court could find no interest of the state which would be 
§11.5. 1 315 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970). 
2 Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. Houma, 395 
U.S. 701 (1969). The court also relied upon Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970), 
and Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970), in which statutory voter classifi-
cations were held wanting in equal protection. 
7
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advanced by the establishment of two categories of potential voters 
and the allowance of voting eligibility to members of only one such 
category. 
The court recognized that, as recently as 1965, the Supreme Court 
summarily affirmed, per curiam, a decision upholding a Maryland 
voter-qualification standard similar to that of Massachusetts,a but it 
felt that that case had been implicitly repudiated by subsequent cases4 
in which the Court, through full opinions, rejected various residency 
requirements imposed by state laws, including voting laws. An appeal 
has been taken by the town of Marblehead and the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts.5 
Of perhaps more far-reaching significance was Cohen v. Attorney 
General,6 which involved the question of permissible methods of bring-
ing about constitutional amendments. Traditionally, amendments may 
be proposed to the electorate for vote at a general election either by 
the legislature sitting in a joint session as a constitutional convention 
or by a general constitutional convention called by lt~gislative act. 
An outgrowth of the 1917-1918 Constitutional Convention was the 
Forty-eighth Amendment, which provided for popular initiative and 
referendum. The amendment authorizes introduction o:E specific pro-
posals of constitutional amendments into the legislature by popular 
petition. Such proposals are considered by joint sessions of the legis-
lature and, if a proposal receives approval of not less than one-fourth 
of the entire membership in two successive legislatures, it is placed 
upon the ballot for consideration by the voters at the next general 
election. There is also provision for initiative petition for enactment 
of a law. Such a petition is admitted to the legislature, and, if the 
legislature does not act favorably upon it, a supplemental petition 
may entitle the proposal to placement on the ballot at the next state 
election for consideration by the voters. A favorable vote at the election 
would have the effect of making the proposal a law. 
The Cohen case grew out of an initiative petition for enactment 
of a law to establish a general constitutional convention to consider 
revision, alteration, and amendment of portions of the Massachusetts 
Constitution. The suit was brought to prohibit the placement of the 
petition upon the ballot at the 1970 election. The Supreme Judicial 
Court, considering the extended discussion and debate in the 1917-1918 
Constitutional Convention over the initiative and refe:rendum, con-
cluded that a proposal to call a constitutional convention was not a 
proposal of a law within the meaning of that word as used in the 
Forty-eighth Amendment. The majority of the Court felt that this 
conclusion was compelled by analysis and comparison of the initiative 
procedures provided for proposed laws and those provided for pro-
a Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), afj'd, 380 U.S. 125 (1965). 
4 See note 2 supra. 
5 Canniffe v. Burg, appeal docketed, No. 8ll, 39 U.S.L.W. 3168 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1970). 
6 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 867, 259 N.E.2d 539. 
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posed constitutional amendments, as well as by the convention history 
of the amendment itself. Three Justices felt that, in the literal context 
of the amendment, an initiative petition for a constitutional conven-
tion was one for enactment of a law, but they agreed that it was 
clearly not the purpose of the amendment to provide for constitu-
tional amendment by the initiative process, apart from initiative pro-
posals of specific amendments. 
Several problems arose under the so-called Home Rule Amendment.7 
In a request for an advisory opinion, the Justices of the Supreme 
Judicial Court were asked whether the legislature could enact a 
statute limiting the right of the town of West Springfield to tap water 
resources in the town of Southwick when it was requested to do so 
by Southwick but not by West Springfield. The answer was in the 
affirmative, since the amendment reserved to the legislature power to 
regulate matters of general state and regional concern, and the pro-
posed legislation was seen to be effective in a class of "not fewer than 
two towns."B 
In Chief of Police v. Town of Dracut,9 a basic question was whether 
the town, which had accepted (pursuant to the local option provisions 
of the statute) G.L., c. 41, §97A, concerning organization of a local 
police department, could in effect rescind its acceptance so as to ac-
complish a reorganization of the department. The Supreme Judicial 
Court ruled in the negative, pointing out that the Home Rule Amend-
ment expressly reserved to the legislature the power to repeal general 
laws and that the acceptance of the statute by the town rendered it 
a general law operative in the community. 
Another case10 grew out of a by-law adopted by the town of Brook-
line providing for public control of rentals charged for housing ac-
commodations. The question squarely presented was whether such a 
regulation falls within the scope of municipal legislative power. 
Massachusetts Canst. amend. art. 89, §6, purports to grant broad 
powers to towns. It provides that a town may, by adopting by-laws, 
exercise any power which the legislature has power to confer upon it. 
This grant, however, is qualified by Section 7, which provides inter 
alia that municipal power shall not include power "to enact private 
or civil law governing civil relationships except as incident to an 
exercise of an independent municipal power." The Court held that 
the by-law was one which governed the civil relationship between land-
lord and tenant and that, in order to stand, it must be shown to be 
in exercise of some police power of the town. For example, the Court 
said, a by-law requiring landlords to maintain lighting in common 
7 Mass. Const. amend. art. 89. 
8 Opinion of the Justices, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 723, 258 N.E.2d 731. 
9 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 258 N.E.2d 531. This case is the subject of student 
comment in §24.20 infra. 
10 Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Bd. of Brookline, 1970 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1031, 260 N.E.2d 200. 
9
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passageways could be sustained as incident to the general power to 
provide for public safety. No such relationship to a police power could 
be found in the rent control by-law. At best, said the Court, such a by-
law is merely incident to a power to control rents. Such circuitous ra-
tionalization was not acceptable. 
The specific issue raised by the case became academic within three 
months when the legislature enacted a statute expressly authorizing 
the town of Brookline to formulate by-laws regulating housing 
rentals.H Also enacted was a temporary rent control statute which may 
be adopted by cities and by towns of over 50,000 p~pulation; 12 more-
over, it extended and expanded the authority of the city of Boston 
to regulate rents and evictions by ordinance.18 The instant case will 
have abiding value as an indicator of the guidelines for determining 
the scope of municipal legislative power. 
The fiscal crisis currently facing private elementary and secondary 
schools occasioned the filing of alleviatory legislation, and the bills 
were referred to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court for ad-
visory opinions. The first bill, Senate Bill 1278, would have provided 
for "purchase of educational services" by the Commonwealth. This 
would consist of reimbursing nonpublic schools their ac1tual expendi-
tures for salaries to teachers of "secular subjects" in their schools. It 
was ruled that enactment of the bill would violate Mass. Const. amend. 
art. 46, which provides that public money or credit may not be used 
for the purpose of "aiding" any school wherein denominational doc-
trine is inculcated, or any school which is not publicly owned and 
under the exclusive control of public officers. The Justices concluded 
that the proposed assistance to nonpublic schools from public funds 
would amount to "aiding" within the meaning of the amendment.14 
A second bill, House Bill 5145, would have provided allotment of 
state funds to each pupil attending elementary and secondary schools 
in the amount of up to $100, but not exceeding (in the case of private 
schools) the apportioned part of the established tuition charge allo-
cated to teaching of secular subjects, and (in the case of public schools) 
the actual cost of the teaching program. Payment would be made 
through vouchers to private school pupils to be endorsed over to their 
respective schools. In the case of public schools, amounts payable in 
respect of the pupils would be paid directly into the municipal trea-
sury. The Justices advised that the proposal would involve an indirect 
form of the "aid" to nonpublic schools which is forbidden by Mass. 
Const. amend. art. 46.15 
Walsh v. Secretary of the Commonwealth16 involved malapportion-
11 Acts of 1970, c. 843. 
12 Acts of 1970, c. 842. 
13 Acts of 1970, c. 863, amending Acts of 1969, c. 797. 
14 Opinion of the Justices, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 789, 258 N.E.2d 7'79. 
15 Opinion of the Justices, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 911, 259 N.E.2d 51l4. 
16 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 853, 259 N.E.2d 768. 
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ment of the state senate. The 1965 census revealed a population distri-
bution which would call for senate districts of an average of 132,382 
persons each. The districts under the existing apportionment statute 
varied in population from 2II,265 to 84,366. The Supreme Judicial 
Court held that this was a gross departure from the requirement of 
equality17 but declined to undertake the task of redistricting by judi-
cial action. The Court contented itself with ordering a declaratory 
judgment that the existing apportionment had become unconstitu-
tional and could not be used as the basi~ of the 1970 election. Within 
three weeks, the legislature reacted by passing, over a gubernatorial 
veto (based upon policy, not constitutional, considerations), a new act, 
redistricting the senate.1s 
The perennial controversy over the statutory scheme whereby the 
operational costs of Suffolk County are borne entirely by the city of 
Boston, without contribution from the public treasuries of the cities 
of Chelsea and Revere and the town of Winthrop, the other munici-
palities within the county, was resurrected in Thompson v. City of 
Chelsea.19 The scheme was sustained against the claim of improper 
discrimination made by 17 taxable inhabitants of Boston. Without 
going so far as to raise an estoppel against Boston, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court pointed out that (I) the scheme of Suffolk County govern-
ment had originally been established at the request, and with the 
consent, of Boston (partially in exchange for the chartering of Boston 
as a city),20 and (2) not only was Boston given administrative control 
of the county government, but it also was the recipient of most of the 
benefits of county operations. The case was disposed of by sustaining 
demurrers of the defendants but, in the light of the Court's discussion 
of the merits, it is highly doubtful that a pleading with additional 
factual allegations would receive a more favorable judicial response. 
§ll.6. Division of legislative authority: Federal and state concerns. 
Several cases decided during the 1970 SuRvEY year addressed questions 
involving the proper allocation of legislative powers between the 
Federal Government and the states. 
Congress, since 1934, has exercised its taxing power to control traffic 
in certain classes of "firearms," for example, sawed-off shotguns, ma-
chine guns, etc.1 The validity of the legislation and of the implement-
ing regulations has been sustained,2 although the constitutional 
17 See the line of cases ranging from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), through 
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), in which the Supreme Court has 
spelled out, with increasingly greater precision, the criteria for implementing the 
constitutional principle of equality of voters' power. 
18 Acts of 1970, c. 498, §2, amending G.L., c. 57, by inserting a new §3. 
19 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1087, 260 N.E.2d 699. 
20 St. 1821, cc. 109, IIO; St. 1909, c. 490, §52. 
§11.6. 1 National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934), provisions of which were 
substantially embodied in Int. Rev. Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C. §§2720-2733, 3260-3263. 
2 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937). 
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privilege against self-incrimination is a bar to enforcement in some 
circumstances.a In the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968,4 Congress undertook to exercise regulatory powe:r over traffic 
in a larger class of weapons. United States v. Trioli5 posed the question 
of whether Congress could establish qualification standards for pur-
chasers of guns in intrastate sales and make it a criminal offense for 
such a purchaser to omit from a statement taken by the dealer a fact 
(conviction of one of specified offenses) which would render him in-
eligible to make the purchase. The United States Supreme Court held 
that the act fell within the power of Congress to regulate commerce 
among the several states. Adverting to findings set forth in the act 
itself, as well as to evidence reflected in the reports of committees of 
the Senate and House of Representatives, the Court concluded that 
Congress was justified in its belief that the ready mobility of guns and 
their potential for causing harm in states other than the state of pur-
chase warranted federal control of the traffic at the point of purchase. 
The Court found the case to be governed by the principles of Heart 
of Atlanta Motel v. United States6 and Katzenbach v. McClung,7 
wherein the impact of local racial discrimination in hotels and res-
taurants upon interstate movement of persons and food was held to 
warrant federal regulation to remove the cause of the restraint upon 
commerce. 
The Trioli case did not call for consideration of the effect, if any, 
of the Federal Crime Control Act upon state regulation of traffic in 
weapons. An analogous question did, however, arise in Penn Central 
R.R. v. Dept. of Public Utilities.s That case grew out of a regulation 
adopted by the DPU requiring self-propelled Budd passenger railroad 
cars to carry certain tools and emergency lighting equipment. The 
railroads, seeking review of the order, contended that the subject 
matter of the regulation had been pre-empted by federal legislation. 
The Supreme Judicial Court examined the federal Boiler Inspection 
Acts9 and the Safety Appliance Acts,lO and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission regulations pursuant thereto, and concluded that the 
specific equipment prescribed by the regulation was not covered by 
federal law. While it recognized that there is a certain amount of 
ambiguity in the course of Supreme Court decision,U the Court held 
3 Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). 
4 18 U.S.C. §922 (1964, Supp. IV). 
IS 308 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1970). 
6 379 u.s. 241 (1964). 
7 379 u.s. 294 (1964). 
s 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1369, 253 N.E.2d 339. 
9 45 U.S.C. §§22·34 (1964). 
10 45 u.s.c. §§1-16 (1964). 
11 Some cases seem to say that federal regulation of a thing amounts to federal 
"occupation of the field" consisting of the category which includes that thing, 
while others seem to say that, unless a thing is specifically subjected to federal 
regulation, it remains open to state regulation. See, e.g., Napier v. Atlantic Coast 
12
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1970 [1970], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1970/iss1/14
§11.6 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 251 
that where, as here, a safety regulation is involved, the state should 
be free to impose such regulation in the absence of a specific federal 
regulation. 
The Supreme Judicial Court proceeded to observe, however, that 
not only did the subject matter of the regulation fall within a twilight 
area with respect to federal-state jurisdiction but, since the affected 
cars operate in more than one state, there may be serious question 
whether the regulation imposes an excessive burden on commerce 
among the states. The Court concluded that, although the rule-making 
procedures mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act12 do not 
call for the plenary proceedings required for agency exercise of ad-
judicatory power,13 the DPU should, nonetheless, have compiled a full 
record which would enable itself and a reviewing court to make an 
informed judgment as to whether the regulation was reasonably neces-
sary in the interest of public safety. The case was remanded to the 
DPU for further proceedings to this end. 
The Supreme Judicial Court thus recognizes the delicacy of the 
problem of adjusting state demands for autonomy in preserving public 
safety and national demands for freedom and efficiency of commerce 
among the states. The Court's insistence upon a clear showing of justi-
fication of state action which impinges upon commerce comports with 
reactions of the United States Supreme Court when confronted with 
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission invoking the Shreve-
port14 doctrine. It is clear that the ICC, the agency designated by 
Congress to enforce the Interstate Commerce Act, has constitutional 
power to make orders which have the effect of superseding state laws 
in appropriate cases. But, when judicial review of such an order is 
sought, the Supreme Court will not enforce it unless it is supported 
by adequate administrative findings, based upon an appropriate rec-
ord.15 In a federalist system, the agencies of each government must 
demonstrate a decent respect for the rights and prerogatives of the 
other government. 
Where conflicts between local and national concerns evolve through 
administrative action, it is both feasible and appropriate to require 
clarification at the administrative level so that fully informed judg-
ments of the conflict can be made. Sometimes, however, the potential 
for conflict is contained within a statute, and manifests itself only 
when a judicial proceeding arises directly under the statute. In such 
a case, a call for legislative clarification may be impracticable, and 
the issue must be resolved in other ways. 
Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926), and Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 
280 (1914), respectively. 
12 G.L., c. 30A, §§2, 3. 
13 G.L., c. 30A, §8. 
14 The Shreveport Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914). 
15 Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194 (1931). Cf. Florida v. United States, 292 
U.S. 1 (1934) (same case after remand). 
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As noted four years ago,l& such a conflict arises in prosecutions of 
interstate railroads for violation of the statute17 which forbids obstruc-
tion of a highway by a railroad train for longer than five minutes. As 
applied to a train engaged in switching automobiles of out-of-state 
origin from a yard in Framingham to an assembly plant in the same 
town, the statute was held not to impose an undue burden on com-
merce among the several states.1s Commonwealth v. Penn Central 
R.R.19 was a prosecution for obstructing a street for about eleven min-
utes. The offending train, composed of 127 cars, was en 1·oute from a 
yard in Framingham to points in Michigan and Illinois, and could not 
complete the highway crossing within five minutes because it was sub-
ject to a speed limit of 15 miles per hour. It further app(:ared that, if 
the railroad were forced to halve the length of its trains in the area, 
it would be faced with additional costs of $71,000 per year in this 
division of its route alone. The Supreme Judicial Court reached the 
judgment that, even though the train was on a through journey to 
an out-of-state point, not on a switching operation incident to a 
through journey, and the record contained specific data as to the 
measure of the burden the statute would place upon the railroad, 
there was not enough evidence to establish that the burden upon 
commerce was disproportionate to the convenience of highway users 
which was sought to be promoted by the statute. 
State tax laws, of course, can be unconstitutional burdens upon 
commerce among the states. This was true of the Massachusetts corpo-
rate excise tax20 as applied to a New York company engaged exclu-
sively in interstate business in Massachusetts. The Appellate Tax Board 
made a finding that all the activities of the taxpayer companies in 
Massachusetts were either interstate transactions or "in aid of" the 
business of lending money from New York to Massachusetts borrowers. 
In such circumstances, the imposition of a Massachusetts corporate 
excise upon a foreign corporation "with respect to engaging in the 
Commonwealth exclusively in interstate commerce" is impermissible.21 
Such circumstances, however, are probably of rare occurrence. Those 
who engage in interstate operations are usually also involved in some 
local activity. Thus, in a case cited by the Supreme Judicial Court in 
the instant decision,22 General Motors' presence in Washington con-
161966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.4. 
17 G.L., c. 160, §151. 
18 Commonwealth v. New York Cent. R.R., 350 Mass. 724, 216 N.E.2d 870 (1966), 
discussed in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.4. 
19 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1274, 252 N.E.2d 218. 
20 G.L., c. 63, §39 (as amended through Acts of 1960, c. 548, §7, and Acts of 1962, 
c. 756, §8). 
21 State Tax Commn. v. Heller 8c Co., 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1278, 1279, 252 N.E.2d 
355, 356, applying Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925), 
and Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951). 
22 General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964). 
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sisted of personnel whose function was to promote sales of motor 
vehicles and parts from Michigan to Washington. A subsidiary func-
tion, however, was to assist dealers in making strictly local sales. And, 
in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-on-Drugs,2s a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
was represented in a state only by salesmen whose purpose was to ob-
tain orders for their out-of-state employer's products. Significantly, 
they also acted as missionaries, "educating" local physicians as to the 
virtues of those products. These incidental activities sufficed to bring 
the respective companies, General Motors and Eli Lilly, within the 
state jurisdiction. 
Board of Assessors of Wilmington v. Avco Corp.24 involved a phase 
of the perennial problem of intergovernmental tax immunity. Avco 
had a contract with the United States Air Force for testing certain 
radar design performance. The contract provided that the Govern-
ment would reimburse Avco the cost of acquisition and installation 
of necessary test equipment, and that title to such equipment would 
pass to the Government upon its acquisition by Avco. The equipment, 
consisting of radar towers, was imbedded by Avco in a field which it 
leased from the owner thereof, the lease containing a provision that 
Avco would reimburse the owner the amount of taxes assessed against 
the land. The local tax assessed against the land included the value 
of the Government-owned fixtures.25 
Avco sought abatement of the tax under G.L., c. 59, §5, which 
exempts "Property owned by the United States so far as the taxation 
of such property is constitutionally prohibited."26 The Supreme Judi-
cial Court ruled that the exemption was not applicable. The equip-
ment was taxed not as property of the United States but as property 
of the taxpayer. The case was held governed by the principle an-
nounced in three cases handed down in 1958,27 sustaining Michigan 
taxes imposed with reference to Government-owned property being 
used by private individuals in the conduct of private business, not-
withstanding the fact that their business was with the Government. 
As long as the tax had no adverse impact upon the Government's title 
to the property, no constitutional objection would obtain. 
§11.7. First Amendment rights: Recent Massachusetts decisions. 
In addition to those discussed in Section 11.2 supra, several other 
cases decided during the 1970 SuRVEY year involved alleged infringe-
ments of constitutional rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
23 366 U.S. 276 (1961). This case, not cited in the Supreme Judicial Court's 
rescript opinion, does not involve state taxing power. It is, however, germane to the 
issue of a state's .iurisdiction over a foreign corporation. 
241970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1025, 260 N.E.2d 179. 
25 Under G.L., c. 59, §3, things affixed to the land are taxable to the landowner, 
even though they are, by agreement, removable by another. 
26 G.L., c. 59, §5, cl. first. 
27 United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); United States v. Muskegon, 
355 U.S. 484 (1958); Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958). 
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In one such case,l the chairman of the art department at the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts, pursuant to an informal practice which had 
developed at the university, arranged with an art instructor to hang 
an exhibition of the latter's paintings on the walls of a corridor in the 
student union building for a period of three weeks. The paintings 
provoked controversy, some viewers finding them offensive. After they 
had been on exhibition for only five days, the university administra-
tion ordered them removed. The instructor then brought suit for a 
declaration that he was entitled to have the exhibition placed on 
display for the balance of the agreed period. The United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that exhibition 
of the paintings was a form of constitutionally protected speech. While 
the painter did not have an unlimited right to use university buildings 
as a gallery for showing his works, the court felt that, absent specific 
regulations containing standards of quality of art exhibits, the uni-
versity was not free to terminate exhibition rights grantedl under usual 
procedures simply because, in its view, the content of the pictures was 
"inappropriate." 
At most the exhibition was a source of some annoyance or 
embarrassment, but this is far from providing adequate justifica-
tion for infringement of plaintiff's constitutional right to free 
expression.2 
Reinstatement of the exhibition was ordered. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
reversed,3 concluding that the absence of specific regulations con-
cerning premature termination of exhibitions was no1t controlling. 
In this connection, the court suggested that the standard objections of 
vagueness and overbreadth customarily raised against legal limitations 
upon free expression are not persuasive where there is no sanction 
stronger than an order to desist. Affirmatively, the court held that the 
university could properly consider the interests of persons using the 
corridor and weigh them against the interests of the artist in making 
a judgment as to whether passersby should be spared unwelcome sights. 
The plaintiff sought review in the Supreme Court, but his petition for 
certiorari was denied.4 
Another case5 pointed out that there are limitations upon control of 
campus expression by public educational authorities. By statute,6 
"activity fees" paid by students at state colleges are collected in a 
fund and disbursements are made in the discretion of the college 
president for the support of various student activities. At Fitchburg 
§11.'7. 1 Close v. Lederle, 303 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Mass. 1969). 
2 Id. at 1112. 
3 424 F .2d 988 (1st Cir. 1970). 
4 Close v. Lederle, cert. denied, 400 U.S, 903 (1970). 
5 Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. i329 (D. Mass. 1970). 
6 G.L., c. 73, §lB. 
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State College, a student newspaper was financed by such disbursements. 
On one occasion, the student editor decided to print an essay by a 
nationally known social militant. When the proposal came to the 
attention of the college president, he refused to allow funds for the 
publication, and the essay was not printed in the student paper.7 The 
president then informed the editor that he had created a board of 
faculty members, and that no funds would be disbursed to pay for 
future issues of the paper unless they were limited to publication of 
materials approved by the faculty board. 
In an action brought by the editor under the Civil Rights Act,s the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled 
that the requirement of clearance of articles through the faculty board 
constituted a forbidden "prior restraint" of future issues of the campus 
newspaper.o Even though there was indication that the faculty board 
proposed to exercise its censorship powers only for the suppression of 
obscenity, which is not constitutionally protected "speech,"lo the 
proposed arrangement was procedurally defective under the standards 
set in Freedman v. Maryland.11 That case held that a censorship 
statute requiring prior approval of motion pictures by the Maryland 
State Board of Appeals must (I) cast the burden of obscenity upon the 
censor, (2) not give an effect of finality to the censor's adverse ruling, 
and (3) make adequate provision for prompt judicial review of ad-
verse rulings of the censor. In a significant footnote to the instant 
opinion, the court expressed some doubt as to whether it would be 
possible to provide for newspaper censorship through a regulation 
meeting these requirements: 
Under the circumstances, we need not decide whether adequate 
procedural safeguards could ever be formulated supporting prior 
restraint of a weekly newspaper. It is extremely doubtful. News-
paper censorship in any form seems essentially incompatible with 
freedom of the press.12 
The court further recognized that educational authorities must 
have power to make adequate provision for maintenance of "the 
order and discipline necessary for the success of the educ~tional 
process." Their regulations, however, must be seen to be reasonably 
related to this, and not some other, end. It might, for example, not 
be improper for an administration to prescribe that the school news-
paper publish only articles composed by students. Such a regulation 
7 It was ultimately printed under a voluntary subscription project sponsored by 
students in a quasi-consortium of schools. 
s 42 U.S.C. §1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart 28 U.S.C. §1343(3) (1964). 
9 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
10 See, e.g., Alberts v. California, decided with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476, 485 (1957). 
11 380 u.s. 51 (1965). 
12 Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1335-1336 n.6 (D. Mass. 1970). 
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could be justified as a device for assuring students opportunities to 
acquire journalistic expertise. But when an administration undertakes 
to censor the content of articles before those articles appear in print, 
it assumes the unacceptable position of imposing thought control. 
Keefe v. Geanakos13 posed an interesting problem also involving 
freedom of expression within the academic context. Plaintiff, a high 
school instructor, assigned to his senior English class the reading of an 
article in the Atlantic Monthly. He discussed the article and explained 
the author's use of a word appearing therein.14 As a result, the in-
structor was suspended, and the school committee brought charges 
seeking his dismissal. In an action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, in which 
the instructor sought to restrain the dismissal proceedings, the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied a prelimi-
nary injunction, holding that there was no probability that. the plaintiff 
would ultimately prevail. The First Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed,15 holding that the article was not obscene, even under ob-
scenity standards governing communications to juveni.les.16 While 
recognizing that the classroom episode might well be offensive to 
parents who learned of it, the court concluded that parents' sensi-
bilities are not the full measure of what is proper education. The 
court was also impressed with the absence, from school department 
regulations, of narrowly drawn criteria governing the scope of class-
room utterances of teachers. 
The foregoing trilogy of cases would seem to convey the message 
that freedom of expression in an academic setting must be evaluated 
by taking into account the entirety of the setting. Thus, the art 
teacher whose paintings were excluded from the public corridor might 
find justification in exhibiting them on the walls of his classroom. And 
the teacher who was sustained in using shocking language in a lecture 
to his class might well be subjected to discipline if he repeated the 
performance at a school football rally. 
In the case of Yenofsky v. SilkP the requirement that the licensing 
authority adhere to clear, narrowly drawn standards, particularly 
significant when licensing power over public assemblies is asserted, was 
applied. A group of peace advocates desired to make a public demon-
stration of opposition to the military action of the United States in 
Vietnam. It was to take the form of a parade through the streets of the 
town of Randolph by some 200 marchers, terminating on the steps of 
the town hall with a reading of the names of American soldiers 
killed in Vietnam. An application for the requisite parade permit was 
13 305 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Mass. 1969). This case is the subject of student comment 
in §11.11 infm. 
14 As the First Circuit Court of Appeals put it, "The word, admittedly highly 
offensive, is a vulgar term for an incestuous son." 418 F.2d 359, 361 (1st Cir. 1970). 
15 Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969). 
16 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
17 305 F. Supp. 991 (D. Mass. 1969). 
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denied without specification of reason(s). The only pertinent regula-
tion was one which simply provided that there should be no parade in 
the town streets without a permit. The United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts, in an action under the Civil Rights 
Act, concluded that the regulation gave the licensing officials arbitrary 
power and, furthermore, that it had been exercised in an arbitrary way. 
The case was held to be governed by the principle of Shuttlesworth v. 
Birmingham,1s and the town was ordered to issue a permit for the 
parade as well as protect the paraders from traffic and other hazards. 
In another development involving claimed contravention of First 
Amendment rights, the city of Boston adopted a censorship ordinance 
which would require sellers of books, magazines and pictures, who 
keep their wares or parts thereof in "adults only" sections of their 
shops, to register with the city clerk and to cause their registration 
numbers to be imprinted on all books, magazines and pictures sold 
by them. The ordinance also provided that no person finally con-
victed of violation of the obscenity statutes would be eligible for 
registration, and that registrants must disclose not only the names of 
all persons having financial interest in the business but the names of 
the suppliers of books, magazines and pictures as well. 
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
issued an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance, holding it 
unconstitutional on several grounds.19 In the first place, permanent 
disqualification from future selling after a conviction was objection-
able as analogous to the previous restraint of future publications 
condemned in Near v. Minnesota.2o The requirement of disclosure of 
names of business associates and suppliers was held to have a chilling 
effect on circulation of constitutionally protected material.21 Secondly, 
the requirement that a registration number be stamped on each 
article sold could not be justified as a means of enforcing the laws as 
to sales of pornographic material to minors. Such a requirement, im-
posed for this purpose, might well amount to invasion of the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination. In the third place, the 
requirement of stamping all materials sold, and not merely things 
which are contraband for minors, renders the ordinance overbroad 
and inhibits the stocking and sale to adults of materials which may 
lawfully be sold to adults.22 
In 1961, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Demetropolos v. Common-
wealth,23 construed the general obscenity statute24 as one which re-
quires knowledge of the obscene character of a sold publication as a 
18 394 u.s. 147 (1969). 
19 Broadway Distributors, Inc. v. White, 307 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mass. 1970). 
20 283 u.s. 697 (1931). 
21 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
22 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). 
23 342 Mass. 658, 175 N.E.2d 259 (1961). 
24 G.L., c. 272, §28A. 
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necessary ingredient of the offense of selling obscene materials, even 
though the statute did not itself expressly predicate guilt upon scienter. 
In so doing, the Court preserved the statute, admittedly susceptible of 
constitutional attack, from invalidity under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution: "[W]here a statute may be construed 
as either constitutional or unconstitutional, a construction will be 
adopted which avoids an unconstitutional interpretation,''211 In Com-
monwealth v. Girard,26 the Court was faced with the statute forbidding 
transfer of certain obscene (as defined by statute) materials to 
juveniles.27 The statute expressly provided that proo:E of the de-
fendant's knowledge of the offensive character of the book,, picture, etc., 
is not necessary to establish guilt of violation of the statute. The Court 
held that this omission is constitutionally objectionable, in that it 
would tend to make sellers hesitant to sell any publication with which 
they were not familiar in detail, thus exerting an unacceptable chilling 
effect upon legitimate publication. In a companion case,28 the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that not only is the defendant's scienter an element 
of the offense of sale of obscene materials, but such scienter must be 
alleged in the complaint or indictment charging the crime. 
§11.8. Criminal procedure: Recent Massachusetts decisions. Com-
monwealth v. Brady1 raised the issue of whether a defendant is entitled 
to a jury trial of factual issues which form the basis of a motion to 
dismiss an indictment. Brady moved for dismissal of indictments 
against him on the ground that an unauthorized person was present 
in the grand jury room while the grand jury was considering the 
indictments. The person named in the supporting affidavit, a member 
of the Massachusetts state police, was unquestionably not an "autho-
rized person." The sole issue presented at trial was whether that 
person was, in fact, present in the grand jury room during the jury's 
deliberations. Under G.L., c. 278, §30A, the trial jud,ge, "being of 
opinion that a question of law was presented of such doubt and im-
portance as to require the decision of this court,"2 reported the fol-
lowing question: "Does the defendant have a right to a. trial by jury 
on the question of fact as to whether an unauthorized person was 
present in the grand jury room during the testimony of the defendant 
before the grand jury?"S 
In its resolution of that question, the Supreme Judicial Court ana-
logized to the disposition of pretrial motions to suppress evidence 
based upon the ground of unconstitutional search and seizure.4 Factual 
25 342 Mass. 658, 660, 175 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1961). 
26 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 11!13, 260 N.E.2d 650. 
27 G.L., c. 272, §30. 
28 Commonwealth v. Palladino, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1127, 260 N.JI<:.2d 65!1. 
§11.8. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 459, 257 N.E.2d 465. 
2 Id. at 460, 257 N.E.2d at 466. 
s Ibid. 
4 Shaw v. Commonwealth, !154 Mass. 583, 238 N.E.2d 876 (1968). 
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issues generated by such motions are adjudicated by the judge and not 
by a jury. . . 
. . . Often such motions involve issues of fact as well as law, 
but the legality of the search is none the less a question for the 
judge.5 
Likewise, a post-sentence motion to vacate a plea of guilty on the 
ground that it was not voluntary presents factual issues for resolution 
by the court rather than a jury.6 
In another case, 7 it appeared that one Gilday had been convicted 
in the Superior Court on a charge of armed robbery in 1964. At his 
trial he testified in his own behalf, and the prosecution introduced, for 
impeachment purposes, records of five previous convictions. In three 
of the cases, he had not been represented by counsel, although in the 
two more recent (and more serious) cases he did have counsel. Having 
been sentenced to a long penitentiary term, Gilday applied for federal 
habeas corpus relief on the ground that the state's use of the records 
of his uncounseled convictions violated rights declared to be constitu-
tionally protected in the 1967 Supreme Court decision of Burgett v. 
Texas.s 
The case raised the familiar, but difficult, question of whether 
Burgett, insofar as it announces "new" constitutional doctrine, must be 
given "retroactive" effect, that is, whether a trial court decision in 
conflict with Burgett, but made prior to it, is subject to successful col-
lateral attack after the "new" doctrine is announced. The United 
States Court of Appeals held that the answer must be in the affirmative. 
Without proper waiver, absence of defense counsel "so jeopardizes the 
fairness of a trial that any ensuing conviction is likely to be un-
reliable."9 The court concluded that this is a relevant consideration, 
whether the prior uncounseled convictions are used as part of the proof 
of guilt, or for the purpose of enhancing punishment, or to impeach 
the credibility of the defendant who testifies in his own behalf. 
The court of appeals proceeded, however, to rule that failure of the 
trial court to anticipate the Burgett ruling did not necessarily so taint 
the trial as to demand reversal of the conviction. Running parallel to 
the doctrine of "retroactivity" of newly propounded constitutional 
law (where applicable) is the doctrine that, if shown beyond a reason-
able doubt that the error was harmless to the defendant, such error will 
not fatally Haw the conviction.10 The court proceeded to review the 
entire trial record, satisfying itself that the testimony of eyewitnesses 
against Gilday was overwhelming and that his own story was as un-
5 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 459, 460-461, 257 N.E.2d 465, 466. 
6 Commonwealth v. L'ltalien, 352 Mass. 424, 226 N.E.2d 192 (1967). 
7 Gilday v. Scafati, 428 F.2d 1027 (1st Cir. 1970). 
8 389 u.s. 109 (1967). 
9 428 F.2d 1027, 1029 (1st Cir. 1970). 
10 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
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convincing as his attempt to explain incriminating circumstantial 
evidence; hence the erroneous admission of the three uncounseled 
convictions was not reversible error. Gilday unsuccessfully sought 
Supreme Court review.n 
Commonwealth v. French12 was a murder case brought against 
defendants alleged to be leading members of the orga.nized under-
world. After the indictments for the murder of one Dee1~an had been 
returned, Cassesso, one of the defendants, first through an intermediary, 
and later directly, approached one Glavin, who was serving a life 
sentence for murder. It was proposed that Glavin confess, falsely, to 
the murder of Deegan so as to exculpate Cassesso. The inducement was 
an undertaking to make financial provision for Glavin's family. 
Glavin, fearing that his life was in danger, reported the proposal to 
FBI agents and, at their suggestion, had further talks with Cassesso, 
ostensibly to "school" Glavin on the details of the Deegan murder in 
order to make his proposed false confession of that murder plausible. 
It was objected that this procedure was an unlawful use of Glavin as 
a decoy for the prosecution, in violation of Cassesso's rights under 
Massiah v. United States.13 That case held that use of a false friend 
of an indicted person to induce him to make incriminatilng statements 
which could be overheard by the police was an invasion of the con-
stitutionally protected right of an indicted person to the assistance of 
counsel. Recognizing that Massiah has been construed as forbidding 
any and all use of police decoys surreptitiously to obtain incriminating 
statements from indicted persons,14 the Court felt that it should not 
be so construed in the circumstances of this case. The two cases are 
distinguishable, the Court held, in that the Massiah decoy took the 
initiative in extracting the incriminating statements, whereas here the 
statements were offered by Cassesso on his own initiative, and Glavin 
merely listened. The Court was also impressed by the fact that 
Cassesso's statements were made in pursuance of his own plan to 
engineer a further unlawful act, the proposed false confession. 
Another of the many defense exceptions in the case was based upon 
denial of various motions for severance of the trials of the various de-
fendants. These were based primarily upon Bruton v. United States,lfi 
which held that when one defendant makes an out-of-court confession 
implicating a codefendant, admission of the confession, even though 
qualified by instructions limiting it to use as evidence against the 
first defendant, violates the codefendant's right of confrontation be-
cause of the danger of the jury's disregard of the limiting instruction. 
The Court decided that Bruton should be limited to i1:s precise facts. 
It found the present case distinguishable in that (1) none of the 
11 Gilday v. Scafati, 428 F.2d 1027, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970). 
12 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 619, 259 N.E.2d 195. 
13 377 u.s. 201 (1964). 
14 Hancock v. White, 378 F.2d 479 (1967). 
Hi 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
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present defendants had made confessions (as distinfluished from ad-
missions),16 (2) some of the defendants took the sta~d and were thus 
available for cross-examination, and (3) here, unlike the Bruton situa-
tion, there were conspiracy charges necessitating substantial relaxation 
of the usual hearsay rules. 
Not surprisingly, numerous search-and-seizure decisions were 
rendered by the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1970 SuRVEY 
year. Perhaps the most interesting of these was Commonwealth v. 
PerezP in which the Court carefully elucidated the application of 
various basic principles of the law of arrest and search to a particular 
fact situation. In its narration of the facts known to the police at the 
time of Perez' arrest for murder, the Court clearly found sufficient cir-
cumstantial evidence to constitute probable cause which would both 
justify the arrest and support an application for a warrant to search 
the apartment of the accused. Concededly, the police had continually 
used the expression "suspicion of murder" in effecting the arrest and 
in subsequent actions; and their obsession with the jargon of "sus-
picion" had led them to book the accused (upon the advice of a court 
clerk) for vagrancy. Moreover, the absence of evidence supporting the 
subsequent charge of vagrancy was undisputed. However, 
... [t]he fact that the arresting officer used the word "suspicion" 
does not operate to convert probable cause to arrest, if it existed, 
into mere suspicion .... Neither is it controlling that the police 
... applied for a complaint charging vagrancy. Certainly the 
detaining of a suspect on a charge of vagrancy for the purpose of 
conducting further investigation of another crime cannot be 
condoned.18 
The crucial fact in the case, therefore, was the arrest of Perez for 
murder with probable cause; the subsequent booking on an unfounded 
charge of vagrancy for the purpose of continuing investigation of the 
felony was immaterial. 
Another case in which the accused unsuccessfully sought to in-
validate his conviction on the ground of improper search and seizure 
of evidence was Commonwealth v. Ellis.19 Specifically, Ellis contended, 
inter alia, that the affidavit upon which the search warrant was based 
was inadequate under G.L., c. 276, §2b, under Mass. Const. art. 14, and 
under U.S. Const. amend. IV. Perhaps the lasting significance of E<lis 
resides in the Court's enlightening discussion of the sort of recitals 
required to be made in an affidavit in support of an application for a 
search warrant. 
Two other cases involved the increasingly controversial problem of 
16 See Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 151 N.E. 839 (1926). 
17 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 545, 258 N.E.2d l. 
18 Id. at 553, 258 N.E.2d at 7. 
19 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 13, 254 N.E.2d 408. 
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the constitutional status of laws imposing the penalty of death for 
crimes. The Massachusetts statute2o provides that an individual whose 
beliefs preclude a finding of guilty in a capital case may not serve as 
a juror in such a case. In a jury venire summoned for trial of a murder 
case, there were eight persons who indicated upon voir dire examina-
tion that they were opposed to capital punishment. One of them 
indicated that his opposition would preclude his agreement to a verdict 
of guilty. Four others indicated that their beliefs would render them 
unable to make an objective judgment in considering whether to re-
commend that the death sentence not be imposed in the event of a 
verdict of guilty. The other three prospective jurors were not queried 
as to whether their beliefs would affect their determinations as to 
either guilt or punishment. All eight were excused as not standing 
indifferent. A motion for mistrial based upon the excuse of these 
jurors for cause was denied, the trial proceeded, and the defendant was 
found guilty, the jury recommending against imposition of the death 
penalty. 
The recommendation of leniency took the case out. of the principle 
announced in Witherspoon v. Illinois,21 that a sentence of death im-
posed by a jury from which opponents of capital punishment have 
been excluded is constitutionally impermissible. That case, and the 
companion case, Bumper v. North Carolina,22 however, made it clear 
that a jury so composed is not, at least as a matter of law, so prosecu-
tion-oriented as to lack the impartiality required of a jury. While the 
Supreme Judicial Court would have preferred an inquiry at the voir 
dire examination as to whether the jurors' opposition to capital 
punishment "would interfere with a determination of the guilt of the 
defendant,"23 the failure of the trial judge to make such inquiry before 
excusing three of the jurors was not reversible error.:l4 The Court 
declined to find that a jury so composed affected the "integrity of the 
fact-finding process," citing Linkletter v. Walker,25 where the quoted 
language was used to justify the Supreme Court's refusal to give 
retroactive effect to the doctrine announced in Mapp v. Ohio.26 It is 
difficult to understand how, if exclusion of opponents of capital 
punishment from juries -does not establish the juries as prosecution-
oriented, inclusion of such persons in juries would, without more, 
make the juries impermissibly defense-oriented. 
The difficulty is not resolved by consideration of the subsequent case 
of Commonwealth v. Mangum.27 There, the trial judge had fully ex-
20 G.L., c. 278, §3. 
21 391 U.S. 510 (1968),. discussed in.l968 Ann. Surv .. .Mass. Law §7.1. 
22 391 u.s. 543 (1968). . .. . 
23 Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 354 Mass. 598, 239 N.E.2d 5 (1968). 
24 Commonwealth v. Connolly, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh; 63,. 255 N.E.2d 191. 
25 381 u.s. 618 (1965). 
26 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
271970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 305, 256 N.E.2d 297 ... 
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plored the impact of prospective jurors' opposition to capital punish-
ment upon their ability to return findings of guilty in capital cases 
where the evidence so warrants. Nine jurors were excused upon 
findings that their beliefs would affect their judgment. A tenth juror 
said, in response to pertinent questions, only that she did not know. 
She, too, was excused as not standing indifferent. Judgment against 
the defendant was affirmed on the authority of the Connolly case. The 
opinion of the Court focused upon the excuse of the tenth juror, and 
the Court observed that the impartiality or indifference of a juror is 
a quality which must appear affirmatively. One is reluctant to believe 
that a corollary of this requirement is that partiality is a quality which 
may be inferred from a lack of sympathy with the pertinent rules of 
law. 
It may well be that issues about the standards of impartiality of 
jurors are not of constitutional dimension, and that the Supreme 
Judicial Court need not have done more than decide whether the 
exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment fell within the 
statutory authority of the trial judge. Jury statutes which have tended 
to promote the choice of juries composed of members of a particular 
economic or intellectual class,2s or of a particular political leaning,29 
have been considered to present constitutional problems; but the 
problems have been resolved in favor of the statutes, albeit by divided 
courts. 
STUDENT CoMMENTs 
§ll.9. Right to public trial: Commonwealth v. Marshall.l 
Defendant had been indicted for the crimes of sodomy; unnatural 
and lascivious acts with boys under 16; indecent assault and battery 
upon boys under 14; and being a lewd, wanton and lascivious person 
in speech and behavior.2 At the trial, before any evidence was taken, 
the district attorney moved that the proceedings be conducted in a 
private hearing. The trial judge allowed the motion, stating that 
"because of the age of the victims" everyone except the witness was 
to be excluded from the courtroom. Among those excluded were the 
defendant's mother, sister, brother and a friend. The defendant 
excepted, assigning as reasons the following: (1) the trial judge had 
violated the constitutional right of the defendant to a public hearing, 
and (2) the judge had misconstrued the provisions of G.L., c. 278, 
28 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Moore v. Ne~ York, _333 U.S. 565 (1948). 
29 Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948); Denn1s v. Umted States, 339 U.S. 
162 (1950). 
§11.9. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1315, 253 N.E.2d 333. 
2 G.L., c. 272, §34 (sodomy); id. §35A (unnatural and lascivious acts); G.L., c. 265, 
§13B (indecent assault and battery); G.L., c. 272, §53 (being a lewd, wanton and 
lascivious person). 
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§16A, dealing with the exclusion of the public from th€: trial of sex 
offenses involving minors.s 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in reversing the judgment of the 
trial court, HELD: Defendant had been deprived of the right to a 
public trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and the trial judge 
had misconstrued G.L., c. 278, §16A. In construing the statute, the 
Supreme Judicial Court relied heavily on the construction given it 
by Chief Justice Qua, speaking for the majority in Commonwealth v. 
Blondin.4 In that case Blondin and the defendants in companion 
cases· had each been convicted of the crimes of rape and of abuse of 
a female child under 16 years of age. One of the reasons urged for 
reversal was the denial of the right to a public trial, the trial court 
having excluded the public in reliance upon the provisions of Section 
l6A.5 The Court in Blondin stated that the statute had been passed 
as a reasonable measure taken by the legislature to better serve the 
public interest.6 The Court also noted that the statute which dis-
tinguishes between the general public and those persons having a 
direct interest in the case "is to be strictly construed in favor of the 
general principle of publicity."7 
Recognizing the legislative intent to distinguish between persons 
having a legitimate interest and those attracted only by the sensa-
tional issues involved, the Court in Blondin held that the statute must 
not be construed so as to exclude parents, spouse or even a friend of 
the defendant if he desires their presence, because they might give 
him assistance or comfort without interfering with the triaLS In the 
instant case, the Supreme Judicial Court, relying on Blondin, held that 
the exclusion of Marshall's relatives and friend was beyond the per-
missible scope of Section 16A because such a ruling by the trial court 
was not a strict construction in favor of the general principle of pub-
licity.9 . 
In protesting the trial judge's granting of the district attorney's 
motion to exclude everyone except the witnesses, Marshall also raised 
the issue of the possible violation of his constitutional right to a public 
trial. In deciding this question the Court held that the exclusion was 
in violation of the Sixth Amendment, which requires that "In all 
s G.L., c. 278, §16A, reads: "At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, 
incest, carnal abuse or other crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen 
years of age is the person upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to 
have been committed, or at the trial of a complaint or indictment for getting a 
woman with child out of wedlock, or the non-support of an illegitimate child, the 
presiding justice shall exclude the general public from the court room, admitting 
orily such persons as may have a direct interest in the case." 
4!124 Mass. 564, 87 N.E.2d 455 (1949). 
5 Id. at 569, 87 N.E.2d at 459. 
6 Id. at 570-571, 87 N.E.2d at 459-460. 
'11d. at 571, 87 N.E.2d at 460. 
Slbid. 
9 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1!115, lll17, !15!1 N.E.2d llllll, !1!14. 
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criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial. ... " (Emphasis added.) The rationale for this holding 
was predicated upon the Supreme Judicial Court's stated assumption 
that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial would be held by 
the United States Supreme Court to be applicable to this trial,lo Upon 
the basis of this assumption, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that, 
even if the violation of Section 16A were held to be harmless error, 
the conviction must still be reversed, as a showing of prejudice has 
been held not to be necessary when the conviction is not a result of 
public proceedings.ll 
In assuming the applicability of the Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial to the instant proceedings, the Supreme Judicial Court 
relied on the leading case of In re Oliver.12 In that case the Supreme 
Court reversed petitioner's conviction for criminal contempt on the 
ground that the conviction and the sentence were handed down in 
the secrecy of the grand jury chamber. The cause of the contempt 
conviction was that petitioner, who had been called before a Michigan 
one-man-judge grand jury investigation, gave testimony which the 
judge did not believe because it did not "jell" with testimony pre-
viously given in secret by at least one other witness. In holding that an 
accused can not be tried and convicted for contempt of court in grand 
jury secrecy, the Court, speaking through Justice Black, stated: 
In view of this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings, 
their inherent dangers to freedom, and the universal require-
ment of our federal and state governments that criminal trials 
be public, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one 
shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law means 
at least that an accused can not be thus sentenced to prisonP 
Although the Supreme Court did not squarely decide that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial must be applied in state proceed-
ings,14 the Supreme Judicial Court's assumption that the right would 
be held to so apply would seem to be valid. This is clear when viewed 
in the light of the decision in Oliver and the Supreme Court's rec-
ognition in that case that all courts have held that an accused is, at 
the very least, entitled to have his lawyer, relatives and friends pres-
ent.1~> 
The validity of the assumption becomes even more apparent when 
10 Id. at 1318, 253 N.E.2d at .335. 
11 United States v. Kohli, l72 F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir. 1949); Tanksley v. United 
States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944); Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 398-399 (8th 
Cir. 1917). 
12 333 u.s. 257 (1948). 
13 Id. at 273. 
14 United States ex rei. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965), and United 
States ex rei. Bruno v. Herold, 246 F. Supp. 363 (N.D.N.Y. 1965), state that this 
question is still open. 
111 333 u.s. 257, 272 (1948). 
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one considers the trend in modern case law. Since the decision of 
Gideon v. Wainwright16 in 1963, the United States Supreme Court 
has been unmistakably moving toward total application of Sixth 
Amendment rights to state criminal proceedings.17 Indeed, the federal 
courts of the Fourth Circuit have already held, citing Oli<'Jer, that the 
right to a public trial has been extended to the state procet~dings under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18 If the Su-
preme Court intends that the rights afforded by the Sixth Amendment 
be extended to defendants in state criminal prosecutions, it must logi-
cally provide a safeguard against the denial of these rights in secret 
proceedings. This would be most easily accomplished by applying to 
the states the additional right to a public trial. 
The traditional Anglo-American fear and distrust of secret judicial 
proceedings has been interpreted by some as a reaction to the horrors 
created by the Spanish Inquisition and the abuse of the lettre de 
cachet19 by the monarchs of France.2o Others have attributed it to 
the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber.21 ~Thatever the 
source of this fear and distrust, there evolved from it the :Eundamental 
notion that no man's life, liberty or property may be taken until 
there has been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public pro-
ceeding. These procedural safeguards of due process are considered 
part of "the law of the land"22 and are reflected in the Sixth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution. The intention to prevent the evils 
of secret judicial proceedings is also reflected in the constitutions,2a 
16 372 U.S. 335 (1963). This case applied the Sixth Amendment r:ight to counsel 
to defendants in noncapital state criminal proceedings. 
17 Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965). This case applied the right to be 
tried by an impartial jury to a defendant in state criminal proceedings. Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), so applied the right of confrontation. Turner also gave 
to the defendant in state criminal proceedings the right of cross-exa.mination. The 
duty of affording an accused person a speedy trial was made mandatory on the 
states by Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967). 
18 Caudill v. Peyton, 368 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1966); Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791 
(4th Cir. 1965); Via v. Peyton, 284 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Va. 1968). 
19 Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L.Q. 381, 388 (1932). The 
lettre de cachet was an order from the French monarch that one of his subjects be 
immediately imprisoned or exiled without a trial or an opportunity to defend 
himself. The device was the principal means used to prosecute crimes of opinion. 
Louis XV is supposed to have issued more than 150,000 lettres de cachet during his 
reign. 
20 Id. at 388-389. 
21 Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1917); Keddingt.on v. State, 19 
Ariz. 457, 459, 172 P. 273, 274 (1918); Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 387, 91 A. 
417, 422 (1914); Williamson v. Lacy, 86 Me. 80, 82-83, 29 A. 943, 944 (1893). 
22 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278 (1948); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-
237 (1940). 
23 Ala. Const. art. II, §24; Alaska Const. art. I, §11; Ark. Const. art. II, §10; Cal. 
Const. art. I, §13; Colo. Const. art. II, §16; Conn. Const. art. I, !j9; Del. Const. 
art. I, §7; Fla. Const. Declaration of Rights, §11; Ga. Const. art. I, §1, par. V; 
Hawaii Const. art. I, §11; Idaho Const. art. I, §13; Ill. Const. art. II, §9; Ind. Const, 
art. 1, §13; Iowa Const. art. I, §10; Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, §10; Ky. Const .. §11; 
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statutes24 and decisions211 of most states. Although there is no express 
provision in the Massachusetts Constitution granting the right to a 
public trial, that right has, by implication, been recognized in Section 
16A. As demonstrated in Blondin and again in Marshall, the statute 
must be construed to favor the general principle of publicity. 
While the public has the general privilege to attend the proceedings, 
the right to have members of the public in attendance is that of the 
accused, in order to guarantee that he will be fairly tried and not 
arbitrarily condemned.26 The prime purpose in affording an ac-
cused the right to a public trial is to effectuate that right. Marshall's 
family and friend did not have the constitutional right to be present. 
Attendance of members of the public is designed to aid in protecting 
the defendant's rights by keeping the trial judge and prosecutor aware 
of their public responsibility and to check any tendency toward an 
arbitrary application of the law.27 The attendance of family and 
friends of the defendant also secures some degree of testimonial trust-
worthiness by inducing in the witness a fear of exposure of false testi-
mony.28 If a trial is conducted secretly in the judge's chambers, the 
defendant may be denied the opportunity to demonstrate- and the 
public to know- that he has been unfairly tried or illegally con-
victed of a crime. It would seem to follow that if the rights to counsel, 
confrontation, cross-examination and an impartial jury have been 
held to be applicable to state criminal proceedings, then the accused 
should also be afforded the right to a public trial as a guarantee that 
the other rights will in fact be granted. 
While the right to a public trial is almost universally accepted in 
the United States, it is quite difficult to define the exact scope of the 
concept of publicity. Held to its literal meaning, a "public" trial 
would be one which every member of the community would be al-
lowed to attend. As a result of such an interpretation, the trial, in 
some instances, would have to be held in an auditorium. However, it 
La. Const. art. I, §9; Me. Const. art. I, §6; Mich. Const. art. II, §19; Minn. Const. art. 
I, §6; Miss. Const. art. 3, §26; Mo. Const. art. I, §18; Mont. Const. art. Ill, §16; 
Neb. Const. art. I, §11; N.J. Const. art. I, §8; N.M. Const. art. II, §14; N.C. Const. 
art. I, §13 (no conviction for crime except by jury verdict in "open court''); N.D. 
Const. art. I, §13; Ohio Const. art. I, §10; Okla. Const. art. II, §20; Ore. Const. art. 
I, §11; Pa. Const. art. I, §9; R.I. Const. art. I, §10; S.C. Const. art. I, §18; S.D. 
Const. art. 6, §7; Tenn. Const. art. I, §9; Tex. Const. art. I, §10; Utah Const. art. 
I, §22; Vt. Const. ch. I, art. lOth; Wash. Const. art. I, §22; W. Va. Const. art. III, 
§14; Wis. Const. art. I, §7. 
24 Nev. Rev. Stat. §178.604 (1968); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §12 (McKinney Supp. 
1969). By implication Virginia has recognized the right to a public trial by autho-
rizing the exclusion of spectators in certain instances. Va. Code Ann. §19.1-246 (1950). 
25 Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 417 (1914). 
26 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 5!18-5!19 (1965). 
27 In re Oliver, !133 U.S. 257, 270 (1948); State v. Osborne, 54 Ore. 289, 295-297, 
10!1 P. 62, 64-66 (1909); Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884). 
28 Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944); People v. Jelke, !108 
N.Y. 56, 62-6!1, 12!1 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1954); 
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has been held that "the constitutional right to a public trial is not a 
limitless imperative."29 The term public is relative then, its interpreta-
tion being determined by conditions and circumstances surrounding 
the trial.30 There are obvious situations where the nature of the 
matters presented would warrant the exclusion of the general public. 
Where the transcript of grand jury proceedings is to be read, require-
ments of secrecy in such proceedings would demand that the general 
public not be present at that time.31 The same result occurs in the 
conduct of juvenile proceedings,32 or where allegedly obscene films 
are to be shown.33 Because of the necessary limits which may con-
stitutionally be applied to the public nature of a trial, it would seem 
to follow that the trial judge has certain discretionary power to ex-
clude members of the public from the courtroom. 
Protection of the process of an orderly trial is a prime duty of the 
court, for an orderly trial is an indispensable conditioiJL of the fair ~ 
administration of criminal justice.34 For this reason, there has been 
a universally accepted reservation to the trial judge of the power to 
exclude disruptive persons from the courtroom. This discretionary 
power, when exercised, must be reasonably employed in furtherance 
of an orderly trial and not productive of a broad, arbitrary exclusion 
of individuals or classes of people.35 The removal of an individual or 
group which is disorderly, blocking the aisles, or interfering with the 
conduct of the trial is a valid exercise of discretion and is not a de-
nial of the right to a public trial.36 
As previously noted, allowing the public to view the proceedings 
and comment thereon gives some assurance of a fair administration 
of justice by reminding both judge and prosecutor of their responsi-
bility. However, when comment by the public takes the form of 
applause at remarks by the prosecutor,37 or the introduction of tele-
vision or radio broadcasting equipment,38 the policy guaranteeing a 
public trial dictates the regulation of public accessibility to the trial 
under these or similar circumstances. 
The need to exclude persons from the courtroom is probably 
greatest when their presence39 or their actions40 intimidate the prin-
29 Lacaze v. United States, 391 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1968). 
30 Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151, 157 (9th Cir. 1958). 
31 Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 618 (1960). 
32 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 n.l2 (1948). 
33 Lancaster v. United States, 293 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
34 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954). 
35 Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151, 156 (9th Cir. 1958); State v. Osborne, 54 
Ore. 289, 298, 103 P. 62, 66 (1909); People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 288, 50 N.W. 
995, 999 (1891). 
36 Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1917). 
37 Lide v. State, 133 Ala. 43, 63, 31 So. 953, 959 (1902). 
38 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
39 Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L.Q. 381, 397 (1932). 
40 United States ex rei. Orlando v. Fay, .350 F.2d 967, 970 (2d Cir. 1965). 
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cipal witness, or when their hostility reaches such a degree as to 
affect the outcome or verdict. On the grounds of possible intimidation 
of the witness, it has been held proper to exclude the public in order 
that attorneys may elicit from young, emotional or immature witnesses 
a clear and definite statement of fact which might well not have been 
given if the public had been allowed to remain.•1 A clear example of 
this would be the examination of a young person in a prosecution for 
crimes involving sex.•2 
It was precisely on this account that the trial judge in Marshall 
granted the prosecution's motion for a private hearing. Because of the 
ages of the witnesses and the nature of their expected testimony, 
everyone, including relatives of the defendant, was denied admission 
in reliance upon G.L., c. 278, §16A. Originally derived from "An Act 
to protect female witnesses involved in illegitimacy proceedings and in 
crimes involving sex," the statute was intended to encourage free 
testimony, "so that more justice would be accomplished, if they [the 
witnesses] could be relieved from the inhibitions imposed by the 
presence of a curiosity impelled audience."43 In Marshall the trial 
judge sought to protect the Commonwealth's right to a full presenta-
tion of the evidence in order that a proper adjudication might be made 
as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Although clearing the 
courtroom in such instances has consistently been upheld, all courts 
have held that an accused is entitled to have his family and his lawyer 
present, "no matter with what offense he may be charged."44 
An exercise of discretion which limits the public's admittance must in-
volve the balancing of the witness's level of maturity and emotional sta-
bility with the right of an accused to a public trial. It would seem that 
the policy favoring that right of the accused far outweighs the pos-
sible embarrassment of a young witness. Because of the importance of 
having other members of society present at trial, any statute pur-
porting to limit the defendant's right to that presence must be strictly 
constructed in favor of the general principle of publicity.45 In those 
cases, such as those within the scope of Section 16A, which warrant 
limited attendance at the trial, any prejudice which might arise inci-
dent to the exclusion of the general public will be counteracted by the 
presence of friends and relatives of the accused.46 Although the pres-
41 Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 1966); Geise v. United States, 
262 F.2d 151, 156 (9th Cir. 1958); People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 63, 123 N.E.2d 769, 
772 (1954); State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 131, 252 N.W. 7, 10 (1933); Moore v. State, 
151 Ga. 648, 659, 108 S.E. 47, 52 (1921); State v. Callahan, 100 Minn. 63, 69, 110 
N.W. 342, 345 (1907); Grimmett v. State, 22 Tex. Ct. App. R. 36, 40, 2 S.W. 631, 
633 (1886). 
42 Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 1966). 
43 Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 571, 87 N.E.2d 455, 460 (1949). 
44 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-272 (1948). 
45 People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 65, 123 N.E.2d 769, 773 (1954); Commonwealth v. 
Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 571, 87 N.E.2d 455, 460 (1949). 
46 State v. Osborne, 54 Ore. 289, 297, 103 P. 62, 65 (1909). 
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ence of Marshall's friends or relatives at his trial would apparently 
have had little effect on the outcome,47 his conviction still required 
reversal48 because his right to a public trial had been denied. 
Had the trial court in Marshall excluded the general public, yet 
allowed the family and friends to be present, there would have been 
no denial of the right to a public trial. As we have shown, the statute 
in question is not, as construed in Blondin, a denial of that right, nor 
is it a denial of due process.49 That courts of necessity possess the 
discretionary power to exclude members of the public from judicial 
proceedings is obvious. That power has, in this Commonwealth, been 
expressed in G.L., c. 278, §16A. In the exercise of this discretion the 
courts must act within the limits of the Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial which, for the purpose of assuring a fair and impartial 
administration of justice, entitles a defendant to have present at least 
his lawyer, family and friends. \ 
JosEPH H. RoY, JR. 
§11.10. Injunctive relief from state prosecution in federal courts: 
Doctrine of abstention and application of Dombrowski v. Pfister. 
I. Introduction 
A long line of cases1 has held that where the constitutionality o£ 
state action is being challenged in federal court, but where there are 
still questions of state law which could be dispositive of the case, the 
federal court should normally refrain from granting equitable relief 
from state criminal prosecutions on the bases of both abstention and 
comity. This doctrine reflects the belief that out of regard for the 
independence of the state governments, and for the smooth working 
of the federal judiciary, the federal courts should avoid needless fric-
tion with state policies. Such friction may result from tentative con-
structions of state statutes and premature adjudication on their 
constitutionality by the federal courts. 
The foregoing policy, with its recognition of the underpinnings of 
abstention and comity, seems to place great restrictions on the power 
of federal courts to intervene in state criminal prosecutions. This 
comment will consider the relevant guidelines formulated by the 
47 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1315, 1317, 253 N.E.2d 333, 334. 
48 See note II supra. 
49 Melanson v. O'Brien, 191 F.2d 963, 965 (1st Cir. 1951). 
§11.10. 1 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 
453 (1919); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 
295 U.S. 89 (1935). This doctrine culminated in Railroad Commn. of Texas v. 
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). 
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United States Supreme Court and the recent attempts by lower 
federal courts to apply them on a case-by-case basis. 
Two recent such attempts in Massachusetts are Karalexis v. Byrne2 
and P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne.3 In the former, plaintiffs were convicted 
in state court of possessing, with intent to exhibit, and exhibiting, an 
"obscene" film-/ Am Curious (Yellow).4 They sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief in federal district court. That court declined to 
abstain and did enjoin future prosecutions in connection with the 
showing of the film. In support of its order, the court held that the 
applicable statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and had a chill-
ing effect upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. This 
temporary injunction was later stayed by the Supreme Court,5 pend-
ing disposition of the federal appeal to be decided by that Court dur-
ing the 1970 Fall Term.6 
In P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne, the district attorney had advised the 
producers and performers of the live theater production Hair that 
they would be prosecuted7 if certain conduct in the play were not 
discontinued. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief in the 
state courts, but the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that 
injunctive relief would not be granted against prosecution unless 
certain "lewd and lascivious" acts were deleted, notwithstanding the 
fact that the play was not otherwise constitutionally obscene. Refusing 
to make the deletions, plaintiffs brought this action in a federal 
district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the 
imminent state prosecution. That court considered abstention inap-
propriate, ruling that the applicable state statute and the common 
law of indecent exposure were so broad as to invade the area of pro-
tected freedoms. Justification for this interference was found in cer-
tain "special circumstances"- the threat of multiple prosecutions, 
substantial financial loss, and the chilling effect of an overly broad 
statute on First Amendment rights. This case, too, is being appealed.s 
In order to determine whether these court actions are consistent 
with, or logically flowing from, United States Supreme Court de-
cisions, it will be necessary to examine the doctrine of abstention and 
the appropriate guidelines as set forth by that Court. 
2 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969). 
3 313 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mass. 1970). 
4 In violation of G.L., c. 272, §§28A, 32. 
5 Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U.S. 976 (1969). 
6 Subsequent to the writing of this comment, this appeal was decided, Byrne v. 
Karalexis, 39 U.S.L.W. 4236 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971). The Court held that because the 
district court was without the guidance provided by Younger v. Harris (see note 
51 infra), the judgment below should be vacated and remanded for reconsideration 
in the light of that decision. The Court noted that the three-judge district court 
had made no finding that the movie exhibitor's rights could not be adequately 
protected in a single state criminal proceeding. 
7 Under G.L., c. 272, §§16, 32. 
s Appeal docketed, No. 484, 39 U.S.L.W. 3126 (U.S. Aug. I, 1970). 
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The doctrine of abstention is aimed at the avoidance of unnecessary 
interference by federal courts with the orderly processes of state pro-
ceedings. It reflects the belief that the federal courts should not 
adjudicate the constitutionality of state enactments fairly open to 
interpretation until the state courts have been afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to pass upon them.D This principle does not involve 
the abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of 
its exercise. Thus the abstention doctrine presents this question: When 
should a federal court abstain from, or defer in, the exercise of its 
jurisdiction in order to permit all or some of the issues to be resolved 
by a state court? 
There are two reasons for the policy of abstention: (1) to avoid 
decision of a federal constitutional question where the case may be 
disposed of on questions of state law;10 (2) the belief tha1t the federal 
system works most efficiently when there is minimal federal in-
vo.vement in the good faith administration of state law.H 
Comity reflects the practice of one jurisdiction giving effect to the 
laws of another. This policy underlies the rule of abstention that 
federal courts should avoid needless jurisdictional conflict with a 
state's administration of its own affairs.12 Comity has two policy 
considerations: first, courts of one jurisdiction will ordinarily give 
effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another out of deference 
and respect, not obligation; second, the court which first acquires 
jurisdiction of the issue has precedence.13 
Thus the policies of abstention and comity, as they evolved, in-
structed federal courts to refrain from exercising jurisdiction if a 
state court interpretation of applicable state law might obviate the 
necessity of deciding a federal constitutional issue, or if the federal 
court's interpretation of unsettled state law was likely to interfere 
with the state's administration of its own affairs.14 
It is important to note that the abstention doctrine is not an auto-
matic rule applied whenever a federal court is faced with a doubtful 
issue of state law; rather, it involves a discretionary exercise of a court's 
equity powers.15 Ascertainment of whether there exist the "special 
circumstances"16 prerequisite to its application must be made on a 
9 Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959). 
10 Ash wander v. TV A, 297 U.S. 288, 346-348 (1936) (concurring opinion by Jus-
tice Brandeis); Railroad Commn. of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). 
11 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 
319 u.s. 157, 163 (1943). 
12 C. Wright, Federal Courts §52 (1963). 
13 United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1967). 
14 C. Wright, Federal Courts §52 (1963). 
15 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964). 
16 Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492 (1949). 
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case-by-case basis.17 The general rule, as stated in Douglas v. City of 
]eannette,1B has been that while the federal court can intervene in 
exceptional cases in order to prevent irreparable injury which is clear 
and imminent, the exercise of discretionary powers should be withheld 
if only slight or inconsequential grounds are asserted. In Douglas, 
the United States Supreme Court had upheld a district court's re-
fusal to enjoin the application of a city ordinance to a religious solici-
tation, even though the ordinance was on that same day held 
unconstitutional as applied in another case.19 
III. Dombrowski v. Pfister 
In Dombrowski v. Pfister,20 the United States Supreme Court clearly 
dispeiled any notion that federalism requires automatic deference to 
state courts. This was the first in a series of cases which have sanctioned 
federal intervention in state court proceedings. The case involved a 
civil action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from threatened 
prosecution under a state antisubversive statute. Plaintiff alleged, first, 
that the prosecution was instituted in bad faith solely to discourage 
civil rights activities and, second, that the statute was an uncon-
stitutionally overbroad and vague regulation of freedom of expres-
sion. The federal district court ordered dismissal.21 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court reversed, endorsing the Douglas doctrine of noninter-
ference with state criminal proceedings, but distinguishing Douglas 
and Dombrowski by emphasizing the "special circumstances" in the 
latter. Among these circumstances was that there would be no ade-
quate remedy at law, since "defense of the state's criminal prosecution 
will not assure adequate vindication of constitutional rights;"22 also, 
there would be irreparable injury were they obliged to await the state 
court's disposition of the case, since "a substantial loss or impairment 
of freedoms of expression will occur .... "23 Finally, a chilling effect 
would result from prosecution or the threat of prosecution under an 
overbroad statute.24 
The central holding in Dombrowski was that federal abstention was 
improper (1) where statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as 
abridging free expression, or (2) where the purpose of their actual or 
threatened application is to discourage protected activities.25 Under 
the first part of this holding, the success of a suit for declaratory or in-
junctive relief depends upon whether the statute is unconstitutionally 
17 Railroad Commn. of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). 
18 319 u.s. 157, 163 (1943). 
19 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
20 380 u.s. 479 (1965). 
21 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (D. La. 1964) . 
. 22 380 u.s. 479, 485 (1965). 
23 Id. at 486. 
24 I d. at 487. 
25 Id. at 489-490. 
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overbroad on its face. Furthermore, it must be unlikely that the 
statute could be rehabilitated in a single state prosecution. Lastly, 
plaintiff's conduct must not be so clearly objectionable as to be pro-
hibited under any construction of the statute.26 Common sense would 
seem to dictate that once the law is deemed unconstitutional on its 
face, the issue of bad faith and threatened prosecution should be 
irrelevant, since an overbroad statute proscribes protected activity 
regardless of the manner in which the statute is enforced. 
Under the second part of the holding, the success of a suit for 
declaratory or injunctive relief depends upon whether a valid statute 
is used for the purpose of discouraging activities which come within 
the ambit of First Amendment protection. Here threatened prosecu-
tion and bad faith are relevant, since the failure to enjoin bad faith 
enforcement may deter people, fearful of being taken to court, from 
protected conduct.27 
One important, though often underplayed consideration in deter-
mining whether the federal court is to abstain, is the likelihood of the 
appropriate state tribunal being able to construe the statute in ques-
tion in such a way as to save it from overbreadth. Obviously, if the 
statute is capable of reasonably foreseeable court interpretation con-
fining it within constitutional bounds, the argument calling for 
federal intervention loses strength. It is generally accepted that a 
federal court will not exercise jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement 
of a state statute which has not been authoritatively construed by the 
state supreme court.28 However, a federal court has broad discretion 
in deciding whether a statute can be saved and whether a state court 
has, in fact, construed it or at least been given the opportunity to do 
so. For example, in P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne, the federal district court, 
noting that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in an earlier 
hearing for an injunction, did not specifically find the statute un-
constitutional as applied, decided not to abstain. It can be argued, of 
course, that the court should not have intervened, especially where 
the challenged statute might have been saved and where the issues 
could have been resolved in an appeal from the Supreme Judicial 
Court to the United States Supreme Court. 
In Dombrowski, as in most cases wherein a plaintiff seeks federal 
court intervention, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2283,29 
26 Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Sig-
nificance of Dombrowski, 48 Texas L. Rev. 555, 564 (1970). 
27 Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 Colum. 1 .. Rev. 808, 814 
(1969). 
28 McGrew v. City of Jackson, Miss., 307 F. Supp. 754, 761 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Bar-
rows v. Reddin, 301 F. Supp. 574, 576 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Albertson v. Millard, 345 
U.S. 242, 245 (195!1); Shipman v. Du Pre, 339 U.S. 321, 322 (1950); American Fedn. 
of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 595-596 (1946); Spector Motor Sc!rv., Inc. v. Mc-
Laughlin, 523 U.S. 101, 105 (1944); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168, 
171 (1942); Railroad Commn. of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 4!16, 500 (1941). 
29 28 U.S.C. §2283 (1964), Stay of State Court Proceedings: ~·A court . of. the 
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was raised as a defense. Section 2283 is a codification of the distinc-
tion that has long been made between pending and future prosecu-
tions. This distinction is embodied in the general rule that a court 
of equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin criminal proceedings under the 
state law, except when such a proceeding is brought to enforce an 
allegedly unconstitutional statute.ao If the federal court first obtains 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, it has the right to hold and main-
tain such jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. However, 
even under these circumstances, the federal tribunal cannot interfere 
when proceedings are already pending in a state court.31 
In Dombrowski, the Supreme Court held that Section 2283 was in-
applicable because there were no pending proceedings; plaintiffs had 
sought injunctive relief before any indictment, and the indictments 
that were in fact pending were handed down after the lower court 
had wrongfully declined to issue temporary injunctive relief. Hence 
there were in law no valid pending proceedings. As a result it was 
unnecessary to resolve the question whether the suit came under the 
expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.32 
When faced with a similar question in a later case, Cameron v. 
]ohnson,33 the Supreme Court held that because of the lower three-
judge court's finding that the prosecutor's bad faith had not been 
established, it was unnecessary to decide whether Section 2283 is a 
bar to pending state prosecutions. Thus, to date, the Supreme Court 
has not decided whether or not Section 2283 is a bar to injunctive 
relief when suit has already begun in the state court.34 Several cir-
cuits considering this question have split. For example, courts in at 
least two circuits have held that Section 2283 bars the injunction of 
pending state criminal proceedings, for the reason that Congressional 
prohibitions cannot be modified by judicial improvisation.35 Courts 
in two other circuits have held that it is not an absolute bar.36 The 
grounds for this position have been stated: 
... §2283 is non-jurisdictional in that it is no more than a statu-
tory enactment of the principle of comity for application in the 
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court 
except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its 
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 
30 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 162 (1908). 
31 Ibid. 
32 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965). 
33 390 u.s. 611 (1968). 
34 Most recently, in Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U.S. 976 (1969), the Supreme Court 
avoided the issue by staying, pending appeal, a temporary injunction against in-
stitution of new prosecutions of the defendants and the executiop. of any sentence 
imposed upon them in the pending state case. 
35 Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964); Goss v. Illinois, 312 
F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963). 
36 Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950); Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969). 
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relationship between federal and state courts. As such, it is to give 
way in those extraordinary cases where the federal injunction is 
necessary to vindicate clear First Amendment rights.37 
This latter view seems to be the most persuasive, especially since a 
strict interpretation of Section 2283, barring federal action unless 
commenced before proceedings are begun in the state courts, appears 
to be incompatible with the spirit of Dombrowski. Even though there 
were no valid pending proceedings in Dombrowski) there were threats 
of prosecution and harassment. 
IV. The Supreme Court after Dombrowski 
Dombrowski v. Pfister cannot be dismissed as a narrow exception 
to existing law, in view of two important cases involving the Dom-
browski doctrine which the Supreme Court has decided since 1965. In 
Zwickler v. Koota38 the appellant had sought injunctive and declara-
tory relief in a federal district court from threatened enforcement of 
a state statute making it unlawful to distribute anonymous political 
handbills. Appellant contended that this statute was an overbroad 
regulation of expression. A three-judge court declined to intervene, 
reasoning that abstention was justified since there were no "special 
circumstances" entitling appellant to an injunction against criminal 
prosecution. 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that, ir-
respective of the propriety of federal injunctive relief, it was inap-
propriate to abstain from declaratory relief.39 The Cou:rt noted that 
the claimed constitutional infirmity was overbreadth and that no pos-
sible state court construction could obviate this vice.4° Federal for-
bearance, it reasoned, would result in delay during which the valid 
exercise of First Amendment rights might be inhibited.41 
The Zwickler opinion emphasized that in Dombrowski the issues 
of injunction and abstention were treated separately. The majority 
opinion agreed with the lower court that in the absence of bad faith 
there could be no injunction issued against the enforcement of the 
statute. However, it noted that even if there were no grounds for 
injunctive relief, this did .not necessarily mean that the federal court 
must abstain; it could issue a declaratory judgment if the state law 
was clearly unconstitutional.42 
The second case, Cameron v. ]ohnson,43 involved a claim that the 
Mississippi Anti-Picketing Statute was unconstitutional on its face or, 
37 Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1969). 
38 389 u.s. 241 (1967). 
39 Id. at 254. 
40 Id. at 249-250. 
41 Id. at 252. 
42 Id. at 254. 
43 390 u.s. 611 (1968). 
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alternatively, had been selectively enforced with the purpose of dis-
couraging constitutionally protected activity. A district court dis-
missed the complaint, holding that the statute was not void on its face 
and that appellants had failed to show sufficient irreparable injury 
to warrant injunctive relief. On appeal, the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed, finding the statute to be constitutional on its face, and 
agreeing with the district court that neither discriminatory nor bad 
faith enforcement had been shown.44 
The Cameron opinion places a great deal of emphasis on bad faith 
enforcement and appears to use bad faith to rationalize both parts of 
the Dombrowski rule, namely, where statutes are attacked on their 
face as abridging free expression, and as applied when the purpose is 
to discourage protected activities. However, a more likely interpreta-
tion is that the Court refused to issue an injunction because it first 
concluded that the challenged statute was constitutional on its face, 
and then determined that there was no showing satisfactory to the 
majority that the statute was being applied in bad faith. Moreover, 
even if it is alleged that the threatened prosecution under a statute 
regulating expression is part of a plan to harass petitioners, a federal 
court should not grant injunctive relief if there is any evidence to 
support a conviction in the state criminal proceeding.45 
To summarize the rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to 
injunctive relief against state prosecution under an allegedly over-
broad statute, it can be stated that a federal court should not abstain 
when a statute regulating expression is attacked as overbroad and the 
applicant demonstrates a resulting deprivation of certain First Amend-
ment rights. If the statute is found to be overbroad, the court may 
declare the statute unconstitutional but cannot enjoin its enforcement 
solely upon that finding.46 If a finding of overbreadth is made, then 
injunctive relief may be warranted if there is a threat or probability 
of prosecution which results in a chilling effect upon the exercise of 
freedom of expression.47 
V. The Lower Courts 
Application of these Supreme Court rulings by lower federal tri-
bunals has hardly been uniform. This is particularly true with respect 
to the question of whether bad faith and statutory unconstitutionality 
are alternative grounds for federal intervention or whether both are 
required. One group of cases has adhered to and sometimes expanded 
the holding of Dombrowski that either bad faith enforcement or facial 
unconstitutionality of a statute regulating freedom of expression may 
44 Id. at 619-620. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Sig-
nificance of Dombrowski, 48 Texas L. Rev. 535, 578 (1970). 
47 Ibid. 
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justify federal equitable relief from state criminal prosecutions.48 In 
Sheridan v. Garrison49 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a refine-
ment of Dombrowski, held that two elements were required to over-
come the prohibitions of the Anti-Injunction Act: 
(I) a bad-faith use of the state's legal machinery with the purpose 
of inhibiting the exercise of the right of free speech (or, alterna-
tively, the existence of a statute unconstitutional on its face 
affecting free speech) and (2) a probability of irreparable injury, 
which is established if there is a showing of a significant chilling 
effect on speech that cannot be avoided by state court adjudica-
tion.50 
Thus it may be inferred that where freedom of expression is at stake, 
any chilling effect on that expression constitutes irreparable injury 
per se. 
Harris v. Younger,51 presently being appealed, is the first clear at-
tempt to liberalize Dombrowski. In that case a federal district court 
ruled that, regardless of the presence or absence of bad faith, it should 
not abstain if the criminal statute in question has an inherently limit-
ing effect upon free expression and is susceptible to an unduly broad 
application. Perhaps indicating an even further extension of Dom-
browski, the petitioner had been indicted by the state and his prose-
cution was pending. 
These cases have not stressed Cameron's emphasis on bad faith, 
considering it, instead, merely an alternative to facial unconstitution-
ality. Even where the statute is constitutional on its face, a growing 
number of cases have justified federal intervention, not on the basis of 
bad faith, but on the grounds of irreparable injury and the chilling 
effect upon plaintiff's First Amendment rights caused by multiple 
prosecutions or the threat of prosecution.52 
48 Entertainment Ventures, Inc. v. Brewer, 306 F. Supp. 802, 820 (M.D. Ala. 1969). 
49 415 F.2d at 699 (5th Cir. 1969). 
50 Id. at 709. 
51 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968). This case has been decided subsequent to the 
writing of this comment, Harris v. Younger, 39 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971). 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the three-judge district 
court. It noted that there was no bad faith nor threat of multiple prosecutions, 
and further, that a proceeding was already pending in the state court which 
would afford an opportunity for adjudication of respondent's constitutional claims. 
Also, there was no showing of irreparable injury, which the Court required to be 
"both great and immediate" before federal interference with state criminal prose-
cutions would be allowed. Noting that there may be "extraordinary circumstances 
in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of 
... bad faith and harassment," the Court nonetheless concluded that "the pos-
sible unconstitutionality of a statute 'on its face' does not in itself justify an in· 
junction against good faith attempts to enforce it .... " Id. at 42015. 
This decision of the Court appears to represent a reaffirmation of the principles 
enunciated in Dombrowski and a reaction against the rather broad interpretation 
of that decision by the lower federal courts. 
52 Grove Press, Inc. v. Evans, 306 F. Supp. 1084, 1085 (E.D. Va.. 1969). Accord, 
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A second group of cases, however, has set forth a more narrow and 
restrictive application of the Dombrowski doctrine based upon the 
premise that the federal judiciary cannot ordinarily halt the prosecu-
tion in bona fide state proceedings.53 It has been held, for example, 
that before a federal court can enjoin a state criminal proceeding, 
those seeking interference must show a chilling effect upon the right 
of free speech stemming from the application of a statute that is un-
constitutional on its face and which is being applied in bad faith. 54 One 
district court has limited the application of the Dombrowski doctrine 
to situations involving an important First Amendment public right, 
such as free speech or debate, but not where the only interests sought 
to be protected are private and commercial, such as the right to 
exhibit a film. 55 Perhaps the most extreme example is a case wherein 
it was held that all of the following criteria must be present before 
the federal court could assume jurisdiction: (I) a statute unconstitu-
tional on its face; (2) bad faith enforcement of the statute; (3) a chilling 
effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights; and (4) no adequate 
remedy in the state judicial system to delimit and enforce the consti-
tutional rights of the aggrieved parties.56 
There have been different judicial interpretations, not only from 
state to state, but also within a state or federal district over a period 
of a few years. Massachusetts affords a prime example. In 1965, in 
Benoit v. Gardner,51 the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
plaintiff must exhaust available state remedies and that any constitu-
tutional rights that are his will be protected in those courts and by 
subsequent review. The mere possibility of erroneous initial applica-
tion of constitutional standards does not amount to irreparable in-
jury. In accord is Burhoe v. Byrne}8 holding that neither irreparable 
harm nor special circumstances justifying injunctive relief were alleged 
or shown, and therefore the convening of a three-judge district court 
was not warranted. More recently, in Hurley v. Hinckleyp a Massa-
chusetts district court has held that it is not enough merely to allege 
overbreadth of a statute in order to invoke a federal court to enjoin 
a state court proceeding. The court found no showing of "special cir-
cumstances" and no showing that the prosecution was acting in bad 
faith, requirements which it considered necessary to justify interven-
tion. 
Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969); P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne, 313 
F. Supp. 757 (D. Mass. 1970). 
53 208 Cinema, Inc. v. Vergari, 298 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
54 Ahmed v. Rockefeller, 308 F. Supp. 935, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Accord, Mitchum 
v. McAuley, 311 F. Supp. 479 (N.D. Fla. 1970). 
55 Carter v. Gautier, 305 F. Supp. 1098 (M.D. Ga. 1969). 
56 Copland v. O'Connor, 306 F. Supp. 375, 377 (N.D. Cal. 1969). 
57 351 F.2d 846 (1st Cir. 1965). 
58 285 F. Supp. 382 (D. Mass. 1968). 
59 304 F. Supp. 704, 711 (D. Mass. 1969). 
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Robinson v. Bradley~~r involved a constitutional attack on the Mas-
sachusetts "threat" statutes, relating to the apprehension and punish-
ment of persons who have threatened to commit a crime against the 
person or property of another.61 In Robinson, a Massachusetts district 
court considered Dombrowski to be unclear as to whether the facial 
unconstitutionality of vagueness and overbreadth, or the bad faith 
conduct of state officials, or both, would have been a sufficient ground 
for the relief sought. The Robinson court suggested in dicta that 
Cameron could be interpreted as requiring both a facially invalid 
statute and bad faith, especially the latter.62 It did not resolve this 
issue, however, since it did not consider the statute in question to be 
facially unconstitutional on the grounds of vagueness or overbreadth. 
The two most recent Massachusetts cases, Karalexis v. Byrne and 
P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne, are representative of a far more liberal applica-
tion of Dombrowski. The courts in both cases found abstention inap-
propriate where a statute was alleged to be unconstitutional on its face, 
with a resulting chilling effect, even though there was no bad faith 
in either case on the part of District Attorney Byrne.63 
VI. Conclusion 
As we have indicated, the major source of controversy concerns the 
circumstances under which a showing of bad faith will or will hot 
be required in order to justify federal interference. Where a statute 
is not unconstitutional on its face, one must show bad faith. It has 
been suggested that the bad faith test should be replaced with a more 
objective test under which either of the following would suffice: (1) 
any proof of harassment, threats or selective enforcement (Cameron), 
that is, a more inclusive definition of bad faith; (2) a showing of in-
sufficient cause, namely, proof that the law sought to be enforced 
could not, in the light of the First Amendment, reasonably and con-
stitutionally be applied to the conduct in which petitioners were en-
gaged.64 
Although there has been no formal espousal of such a change, some 
decisions have amounted to a practical endorsement. One court has 
held that a sufficient basis for equitable relief was established when 
plaintiff alleged that a vague or overbroad penal statute was being 
selectively enforced, thereby stifling First Amendment rights.65 An-
other court has held that conduct legally equivalent to bad faith 
60 300 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1969). 
61 G.L., c. 275, §2. 
62 300 F. Supp. 665, 667 (D. Mass. 1969). 
63 Karalexis v. Byrne, .306 F. Supp. 1363, 1369 (D. Mass. 1969); P.B.I.C., Inc. v. 
Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757, 767 (D. Mass. 1970). But see note 6 supra. 
64 Bailey, Enjoining State Criminal Prosecutions Which Abridge First Amend-
ment Freedoms, 3 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 67, 102 (1967-1968). 
65 Locke v. Vance, 307 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969). 
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prosecution occurs when state officials, in attempting to proscribe ac-
tivities closely related to First Amendment rights, bring criminal 
proceedings under a clearly inapplicable state statute.66 The test of 
insufficient cause relates to the second part of the Dombrowski hold-
ing- where statutes are attacked as being applied for the purpose of 
discouraging protected activities. Even assuming that the attack on a 
statute is justified, it may not always be clear whether that statute is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied. For instance, in P.B.l.C., 
Inc. v. Byrne, it is unclear whether the federal court should have 
found the obscenity statute unconstitutional on its face or only as 
applied to the context of live theatre. This determination may be 
crucial, because where a statute is valid except as applied, a showing 
of bad faith will likely be necessary to warrant federal intervention. 
Few principles are more firmly established in our judicial system 
than the principle that the federal courts must not interfere with the 
administration of criminal justice by the state courts except in the 
most exceptional circumstances.67 Dombrowski and its successors sig-
nify a definite shift away from the passivity of abstention and comity 
to a philosophy of more active protection of First Amendment guaran-
tees. Although the precise limits and scope of that philosophy are yet 
to be clearly defined, there is at least a recognition that where freedom 
of expression and statutory overbreadth are involved, "postponement 
of federal relief may amount to nothing less than an abdication of 
responsibility."68 
DoNALD E. SEGAL 
§ll.ll. Free speech in the classroom: Academic freedom: Keefe v. 
Geanakos.1 The appellant, Robert Keefe, was a tenured high school 
teacher in Ipswich; Massachusetts. He assigned as homework for his 
senior English class an article which used the word mother-fucker. 
Students could select another assignment if they so desired. The follow-
ing day the article was discussed in class. Particular attention was 
given to the origin, context, and reasons for the inclusion of that 
word. The next day, Keefe was summoned to a meeting with the 
superintendent of schools and the principal of his school at which he 
was called upon to defend his use of the word in question. Five days 
later the superintendent of schools requested his resignation, which he 
refused to submit. About one month later, Keefe received two written 
notices. Each notified him of pending Ipswich School Committee meet-
66 Entertainment Ventures, Inc. v. Brewer, 306 F. Supp. 802, 817 (M.D. Ala. 
1969). 
67 McLucas v. Palmer, 309 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (D. Conn. 1970). 
68 Bailey, Enjoining State Criminal Prosecutions Which Abridge First Amend-
ment Freedoms, 3 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 67, 91 (1967-1968). 
§11.11. 1418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969). 
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ings, one to consider his suspension for 30 days, the other to consider 
his dismissal. 
Keefe then petitioned the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts to enjoin the school committee meeting called 
to vote on his discharge. Five charges formed the basis for the meeting,2 
but the district court considered only one of them: "Use of offensive 
material in the classroom on September 3, 1969, and subsequently, 
which use would undermine public confidence and react unfavorably 
upon the public school system of Ipswich."3 
The district court entertained arguments on Keefe's application for 
preliminary injunctive relief. The court noted that two conditions 
were necessary for granting preliminary injunctive relie£.4 The first 
requisite was that irreparable harm would result if the preliminary 
injunction were to be denied. The court felt that this wndition had 
not been satisfied, that "if [the] plaintiff were ultimately to prevail 
monetary damages would appear to be an adequate remedy at law.''ll 
The second requisite for a preliminary injunction was that the 
plaintiff would probably prevail on the merits. The court held that 
this condition was not met. because a recent case6 was interpreted to 
be "strikingly similar on its facts to the instant case .... "7 In that 
case, a high school teacher's contract had not been renewed because 
he had assigned Brave New World for reading and classroom discus-
sion, despite a warning (which prefaced the reading list on which the 
book appeared) that a teacher should not assign a book to a student 
without having familiarized himself with the book, the student, and 
the moral standards of the community. The United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland found no violation of the teacher's 
First Amendment rights: 
... Where the abridgement of the abstract right of free speech 
results from government action taken for the protection of other 
substantial public rights no constitutional deprivation will be 
found to exist. . . . 8 
Keefe appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit for a 
reversal of the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. In 
addition, he requested a temporary injunction pending the determina-
tion of the appeal. Acting summarily,9 the court of appeals consid-
ered the question of the appeal itself, indicating that the ultimate 
2 Keefe v. Geanakos, 305 F. Supp. 1091, 1092 (D. Mass. 1969). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Id. at 1092-1093. 
5 Id. at 1093. 
6 Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1965), afj'd, 348 F.2d 464 
(4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966). 
7 305 F. Supp. 1091, 1093 (D. Mass. 1969). 
8 Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222, 229 (D. Md. 1965). 
9 1st Cir. R. 5. 
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issue of the appeal had been "extensively brief and argued by both 
sides."10 It considered only that charge which the district court had 
considered, the "[u]se of offensive material in the classroom .... "11 In 
reversing the district court's order, the court of appeals HELD: that 
academic freedom would be irreparably damaged by censorship of 
such classroom speech;12 and that Keefe would probably prevail on 
the issue of lack of notice to him that a discussion of the article with 
his class was impermissible.13 Moreover, the court noted that at least 
five books in the school library contained the word in question. As a 
subsidiary holding, it stated that "[s]uch inconsistency on the part of 
the school has been regarded as fatal."14 
The instant case is significant in that the decision rests upon the 
theory of academic freedom, applies this theory at the high school 
level, and seems to treat the teacher as a special kind of state employee. 
The foregoing conclusions are based on a comparison of Keefe with 
previous decisions in this area. 
The source of academic freedom is generally acknowledged by the 
United States Supreme Court to be the First Amendment.15 Like other 
First Amendment rights, it is not immune from regulation, and the 
Keefe opinion concedes that " 'some measure of public regulation of 
classroom speech is inherent in every provision of public education.' "16 
Recognizing that public school speech may be regulated, the court of 
appeals determined the issue to be a matter of balancing the need for 
regulation designed to protect school children from offensive language 
with the rights of teachers and students in the exercise of their aca-
demic freedom. 
. . . [T]he question in this case is whether a teacher may, for 
demonstrated educational purposes, quote a "dirty" word cur-
rently used in order to give special offense, or whether the shock 
is too great for high school seniors to stand.17 
Emphasizing the particular fact situation before it, the court noted 
the basis for its approach to this balancing process: 
We of course agree with the defendants that what is to be 
said or read to students is not to be determined by obscenity 
10 418 F .2d 359, 363 (1st Cir. 1969). See Crane, Court Rules, 8 Mass. Practice 
Series §157 (1969 Pocket Part). 
11 305 F. Supp. 1091, 1092 (D. Mass. 1969). See 418 F.2d 358, 360 n.3 (1st Cir. 1969) 
for speculation by the court of appeals as to why the district court considered only 
one of the charges. 
12 418 F.2d 358, 363 (1st Cir. 1969). 
13 Id. at 362. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
16 418 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir. 1969). 
17 Id. at 361. 
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standards for adult consumption .... At the same time, the issue 
must be one of degree. A high school senior is not devoid of all 
discrimination or resistance. Furthermore, as in all other instances, 
the offensiveness of language and the particular propriety or im-
propriety is dependent on the circumstances of the utterance.18 
This balancing procedure is not unlike that used in libel cases, 
such as Time, Inc. v. Hill,19 and obscenity cases, such m; Ginsberg v. 
New York.20 Ginsberg was convicted for selling to a minor magazines 
which contained pictures of naked women. The sale allegedly violated 
Section 484-h of the New York Penal Law. The United States Supreme 
Court weighed the interest of the state in protecting the well-being of 
the child21 against the interest in protecting freedoms of speech and 
press.22 Obscenity, it was held, was not a protected area of free speech 
or press; and the interest of the state in safeguarding its minors pre-
vailed. 
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, Hill sued for compensatory and punitive 
damages as a result of a play review in Life. Hill's family had been 
held hostage by escaped convicts. This incident inspired a book on 
which the play was based; the Life article revealed the connection. A 
New York statute allowed an action for damages by anyone whose 
name or picture had been used without his permission for trade or 
advertising purposes. Although this was not a libel action by a private 
individual (or a statutory one by a public official), the United States 
Supreme Court applied the same rules as apply in the usual libel 
action. It balanced the state interest represented by the statute against 
the individual interest represented by constitutional guarantees of 
free expression.23 Here, the latter prevailed. It was held that the 
need for "breathing space" for First Amendment freedoms protects 
innocent or even negligent erroneous statements about matters of 
public interest. Only where a false report is published with knowledge 
of its falsity or with a reckless disregard for its truth will the wrongdoer 
no longer be protected.24 In short, in both Ginsberg and Time, the 
United States Supreme Court reached a conclusion about state regula-
tion of First Amendment freedoms by weighing the need for regula-
tion against the need to protect the freedoms in question. 
The need to protect academic freedom, however, had never pre-
vailed against the need for state regulation until Keefe. Virtually all 
cases concerning the behavior of a teacher have dealt with his extra-
curricular activities and their effect on his classroom ability. The court 
of appeals in Keefe stated that "[a]part from cases discussing academic 
18 Id. at 362. 
19 385 u.s. 374 (1967). 
20 390 u.s. 629 (1968). 
21 Id. at 638-641. 
22 I d. at 635. 
23 385 u.s. 374, 388-389 (1967). 
24 Id. at 390. 
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freedom in the large, not surprisingly, we find no decisions closely in 
point."25 More specifically, the courts have been deciding issues which 
deal with a teacher's associations with organizations believed to be 
subversive.26 One example is Shelton v. Tucker.27 There an Arkansas 
statute required every teacher, as a condition of eqtployment in a 
state-supported school, to file each year an affidavit listing all organi-
zations to which he or she had belonged or contributed regularly 
within the past five years. Shelton;s teaching contract was not re-
newed because he had failed to file the required affidavit. He argued 
that the statute deprived teachers in Arkansas of their associational free-
dom. The United States Supreme Court agreed, holding that a state 
may inquire into the fitness and competence of its teachers,2s but that 
the statute was so sweeping as to interfere with associational freedom 
far beyond what might be justified by legitimate inquiry.29 
In each of those cases concerning a teacher's behavior outside of 
the classroom, the basis of the decision was either the inherent power 
of the authority in question (school board or state) or the presence or 
absence of due process. For example, in Faxon v. School Committee of 
Boston,30 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court based its finding 
on the inherent power of state authority to administer public schools 
and to protect public confidence in the school system.s1 In Faxon, a 
tenured high school teacher was dismissed by the school committee for 
asserting his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Before 
a duly accredited subcommittee of the United States Senate, he re-
fused to answer questions about whether he was a member of the 
Communist party, whether he had tried to recruit students and others, 
and whether he had attended certain meetings of the Communist 
party. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld his dismissal on the basis 
of prior cases in which Massachusetts courts had upheld the dismissal 
of public employees whose exercising of constitutional rights "was 
deemed inconsistent with obligations voluntarily assumed in connec-
tion with their public employment."S2 
Exemplary of cases concerned with the preservation and denial of 
due process is the recent case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents.33 
Therein Section 3022 of the Education Law of New York required 
25 418 F .2d 359, 362 (1st Cir. 1969). 
26 See Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 785, 127 N.E.2d 663 (1955); Faxon v. 
School Comm. of Boston, 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954); Keyishian v. Board 
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Slochower v. Board of Higher 
Educ. of New York City, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 
(1952); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1967). 
27 364 u.s. 479 (1960). 
28 Id. at 485. 
29 Id. at 487-490. 
30 !131 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954). 
31 Id. at 533-534, 120 N.E.2d at 773-774. 
32 Id. at 535, 120 N.E.2d at 775. 
33 385 u.s. 589 (1967). 
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the state Board of Regents to issue regulations for the disqualification 
or dismissal of personnel in the state schools on the basis. of member-
ship in subversive organizations. Section 105, subdivision 3 of the 
Civil Service Law, created pursuant to Section 3022 of the Education 
Law, made a "seditious" word or act grounds for dismissal. Seditious 
word or act was defined as "criminal anarchy." The United States 
Supreme· Court held that both enactments were unconstitutionally 
vague, because no teacher could understand the difference between 
seditious and nonseditious utterances and acts. In addition, those en-
actments may prohibit the employment of a teacher who merely ad-
vocates a doctrine which is seditious and does nothing to incite others 
to commit seditious acts.s4 
Keefe varies from both Keyishian and Shelton. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was not concerned with a teach-
er's extracurricular activities, but with his behavior in the classroom. 
The court in Keefe brought the theory of academic freedom directly 
into play by regulating classroom conduct, that is, by establishing per-
missible bounds of classroom speech. Due process was not an issue as 
it was in Keyishian. The power of the school committee was at issue, 
as it was in Tucker and Faxon, but the court looked at that power as it 
related to academic freedom, not as it related to First Amendment 
associational freedoms. 
In only two similar instances has the United States Supreme 
Court acted on the basis of academic freedom. The first, Sweezy v. 
New Hampshire,35 concerned the fate of a university professor who 
testified willingly at a hearing before the state attorney general (who 
was acting on behalf of the legislature) on all matters except his ac-
tivities in the Progressive party and his lectures at the University of 
New Hampshire. He refused to answer those questions on the ground 
that they were irrelevant to the investigation and violated his First 
Amendment rights. When ordered to answer before the state court, 
he persisted in his refusal and was found guilty of contempt. The 
United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the investi-
gation was a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which applies First Amendment freedoms to the states. 
The Court found that Sweezy's liberties in the areas of political 
expression and academic freedom had been invaded, and stated that 
"[the] government should be extremely reticent to tread" upon them.B$ 
The Court continued: "Teachers and students must always remain free 
to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and under-
standing; otherwise our civilization will ... stagnate and die."37 This 
language implies that academic freedom is to be treated as a special 
area of First Amendment rights. 
34 Id. at 597-604. 
35 354 u.s. 234 (1957). 
36 Id. at 250. 
37Jbid. 
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The other United States Supreme Court opinion which is based 
on academic freedom is Keyishian. This case is less noteworthy because 
it relies on Sweezyss and is based primarily on the vagueness of the 
statutory meaning of seditious. On the other hand, it does say plainly 
that academic freedom is a "special concern of the First Amendment, 
which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the 
classroom.''39 
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit in Keefe is consistent with the recognition of academic free-
dom as a special First Amendment concern. Referring to the incon-
sistency of the school's having at least five books containing the word 
in question shelved in its library while prosecuting a teacher for the 
use of that word in the classroom, the court remarked: "we prefer 
not to place our decision on this ground alone, lest our doing so 
diminish our principal holding .... "4 0 The court held that "such 
rigorous censorship" of classroom speech would have a serious "general 
chilling effect"41 on that "'free play of the spirit which all teachers 
ought especially to cultivate and practice. . . .' "42 
The finding was premised not only upon the need for a "free play of 
spirit" in the classroom, but also upon the particular materials in 
question. The court examined the curriculum, an area which courts 
have been reluctant to enter. Chief Judge Aldrich and his two col-
leagues, Judges McEntee and Coffin, read the article and made a 
judgment on the value of its content, noting especially the context of 
the word being protested. While acknowledging that some parents 
may have been offended by the use of the word, the court stated that 
its proper concern was the education of their children.43 In analyzing 
the materials used, the court has entered an area (curriculum and 
classroom conduct) which previously has been the domain of the state 
andfor local school board. 
In its regulation of curriculum and classroom conduct, the court 
indicated that the teacher is to be treated differently than he has 
been treated in the past. Formerly, courts of every jurisdiction have 
held the view that a teacher is to be looked upon as any other state 
employee. The Tennessee Supreme Court in Scopes v. State,44 for 
example, upheld the conviction of a teacher who had been found 
guilty of violating a 1925 Tennessee statute45 forbidding the teaching 
of evolution in the public schools. The Tennessee Supreme Court 
stated that the state was "dealing with its own employees engaged 
38 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
39 Ibid. 
40 418 F.2d 359, 363 (1st Cir. 1969). 
41 Id. at 362. 
42 Id. at 362 n.9. 
43 Id. at 361-362. 
44 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927); cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); 
Epperson v. State, 242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d 322 (1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 97 (1969). 
45 Tenn. Code Ann. §49-1922 (1966), repealed' by Arts of 1967, c. 237, §1. 
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upon its own work. . . ."46 Massachusetts decisions concerning the 
state regmation of the conduct of teachers have reasoned similarly.47 
One such case is Faxon. A case relied upon by the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts in Faxon, Bell v. District Cour.t of Holyoke,48 
upheld the suspension of a fireman for the violation of a rule for-
bidding firemen, while off duty, to take another job. The Supreme 
Judicial Court stated that: 
... [I]t seems to us that the inconsistency between the duty of 
a teacher in the public schools and the exercise of the right not 
to incriminate oneself with respect to association with Commu-
nist organizations is fully as great as in the instance of a police-
man or a fireman who asserts similar rights with respect to other 
activities.49 
In Keefe, the court did not refer to the teacher as similar to a fire-
man or other pub1ic employee, but afforded him special standing by 
protecting his classroom speech in the interest of academic freedom. 
It said: 
... [U]nwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers 
affects not only those who, like the appellants, are immediately 
before the Court. It has an unmistakable tendency to chill that 
free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to culti-
vate and practice. . . . r;o 
In addition to treating teachers like other state employees, state 
supreme courts have ruled in the past that the state has an exclusive 
power to deal with its employees, and to determine the terms of their 
employment. For example, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Scopes 
reasoned as fol.ows: 
... The plaintiff in error was a teacher in the public schools of 
Rhea County. He was an employee of the State of Tennessee or 
of a municipal agency of the State. He was under contract with 
the State to work in an institution of the State. He had no right 
or privilege to serve the State except upon such terms as the State 
prescribed. 51 
... The statute ... is an Act of the State as a corporation, 
a proprietor, an employer. It is a declaration of a master as to the 
character of work the master's servant shall, or rather shall not, 
perform. 52 
46 154 Tenn. 105, 112, 289 S.W. 363, 365 (1927). 
47 Faxon v. School Committee of Boston, 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954); 
Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 785, 127 N.E.2d 663 (1955). 
48 314 Mass. 622, 51 N.E.2d 328 (1943). 
49 331 Mass. 531, 536, 120 N.E.2d 772, 775 (1954). 
oo 418 F.2d '359, 362 n.9 (1st Cir. 1969). 
lill54,Tenn. 105, Ill, 289S.W. 363,364 (1927). 
52 Id. at 111-112. 289 S.W.cat 364-!165. 
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In contrast, while the court in Keefe admitted that it is inherent in 
the nature of public education that classroom speech he regulated to 
a certain degree, 53 the court found "it difficult not to think that its [the 
regulation of classroom speech] application to the present case de-
means any proper concept of education."54 The court rejected the 
theory that a state has an exclusive power to regulate the conduct of 
its employees, particularly its teachers, and seemed to limit that power 
to that of implementing the "proper concept of education." 
It must also he noted that academic freedom had been discussed in 
past cases with reference only to colleges and universities,llli not to 
secondary schools. Sweezy, for example, was a professor at the Univer-
sity of New Hampshire. Keefe, however, is concerned with a secon-
dary school situation. The reason that courts have considered the 
issue of academic freedom only in regard to colleges and universities 
may be that at the elementary and secondary levels of education there 
has been no strong tradition of intellectual freedom such as there is 
at the college and university level.156 The court in Keefe seemed to 
feel that the quality of instruction at the lower levels, especially at 
the high school level, depends to a large degree on the extent of 
academic freedom in the classroom and the intellectual integrity of 
the teaching force. 
Moreover, the court was distinctly concerned with the welfare of 
the students whom the teacher instructs. In addition to its effect on 
Keefe's academic freedom, the court considered the regulation of a 
teacher's classroom conduct in relation to his students. The court 
stated that: 
... [T]he question in this case is whether a teacher may, for 
demonstrated educational purposes, quote a "dirty" word cur-
rently used in order to give special offense, or whether the shock 
is too great for high school seniors to stand. If the answer were 
that the students must he protected from such exposure, we would 
fear for their future;57 
In the past, the effects on students of the regulation of their teacher's 
conduct have not been considered. The Sweezy opinion, for example, 
is based solely on the individual teacher's freedoms, academic and 
political, although it does mention that "[t]eachers ;,tnd students must 
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new 
maturity and understanding .... "58 Probably because past cases have 
53 418 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir. 1969). 
114 Ibid. 
1111 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-604 (1967). 
116 Note, Developments in the Law- Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 
1050 (1968). 
117 418 F.2d 359, 361 (1st Cir. 1969). 
118 354 u.s. 234, 250 (1957). 
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been concerned with a teacher's extracurricular activities rather than 
his actions within the classroom, the effect on his student~. of regulating 
his conduct was not apparent. In other words, when a teacher's con-
duct within the classroom is restricted, the impression he can make on 
his students is directly affected; but where his conduct outside of the 
classroom is restricted, the effects of that restriction on his students are 
more indirect. Perhaps in Keefe, where the regulation of a teacher's 
conduct would have directly affected his students, those effects were 
more visible. In any case, Keefe clearly considered such effects as part 
of the balancing process. 
Keefe has presented Massachusetts courts with a dilemma- whether 
to accept the First Circuit Court of Appeals interpretation of the de-
mands of academic freedom, or to proceed as before in cases like 
Faxon. Two recent cases indicate what could follow if Massachusetts 
state courts would not comply with Keefe: avoidance of the state 
forum. One case, Parducci v. Rutland}59 involved a teacher who sued in 
a federal district court in Alabama, and who won reinstatement after 
her dismissal for assigning a short story by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., to her 
eleventh grade English class. Like the court of appeals in Keefe} this 
district court read the story and found it not obscene.60 In fact, it 
relied on Keefe's consideration of the effects on students of limiting 
their teacher's conduct, and found that the shock of the story was not 
"too great" for an eleventh grade student.61 Moreover, it held that 
tenure was not an issue, since every teacher brings his First Amend-
ment freedoms into the classroom.62 
The outcome of the most recent case in this area merits considera-
tion. It involved a Lawrence, Massachusetts high school teacher, Roger 
A. Mailloux, who was dismissed for writing a four-letter word on a 
blackboard during class. The action, for reinstatement and $50,000 
damages, was brought in the United States District Court for Massa-
chusetts on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Judge Wyzan-
ski, in granting the preliminary injunction, noted that the word 
... is a symbolic word for some radical groups. Flaunting the 
word has become part of the sexual revolution of our times. 
Because the word is such a well-known taboo word, and produces 
such strong reactions, and is so representative of the generational 
conflict, it has, in the opinion of some experts, unusual effective-
ness in making students examine and understand the function of 
language and the relationship of language, social behavior, and 
social controls.63 
The district court considered itself bound by the Keefe decision, which 
59 316 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Ala. 1970). 
60 Id. at 355-356. 
61 Id. at 356. 
62 Id. at 354. 
63 Mailloux v. Kiley,- F. Supp. -, Civil No. 70-1859-W (D. Mass., Dec. 21, 1970). 
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it interpreted as holding that dismissal of a teacher who uses such a 
word in the twelfth grade for purposes of instruction is in contraven-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Lawrence School Committee filed an appeal which was dis-
missed by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.64 The court up-
held the preliminary injunction on the narrow ground that the 
appellant had not met his burden of proof, namely, he had not demon-
strated "an abuse of the district court's discretion."65 But the court 
did not indicate which party would probably prevail, because it saw 
a possible distinction between an English teacher's discussing "a 
serious piece of writing" (the situation in Keefe) and discussing "social 
mores in the use of language with a chalking of a socially taboo word 
on the blackboard"66 (the situation in Mailloux). The court of ap-
peals clarified its opinion in Keefe, saying that it had not intended "to 
give carte blanche in the name of academic freedom to conduct 
which can reasonably be deemed both offensive and unnecessary to 
the accomplishment of educational objectives."67 Moreover, by way 
of qualification of Keefe, the court specified that the lack of a regula-
tion governing the word in question was not by itself proof of a viola-
tion of due process. The judgments of school officials, unless clearly 
wrong, are not to be disturbed. 
In conclusion; it seems clear that academic freedom cannot operate 
if the teacher is treated as merely another public employee. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has expanded the scope 
of academic freedom by its decision in Keefe, although the Mailloux 
decision does indicate a narrowing of that scope. Massachusetts state 
courts have yet to regard academic freedom as an area for special 
First Amendment treatment. It is clear that teachers are bringing 
suits based on the theory of academic freedom in federal rather than 
state courts. If Massachusetts state courts do not follow the lead of 
Keefe, the federal court system will probably continue to be the only 
arena in Massachusetts in which academic freedom will be in issue. 
As a right founded on the United States Constitution, academic free-
dom qualifies for federal district court disposition. Therefore, nothing 
prevents a complete usurpation of academic freedom questions by 
the federal courts. Massachusetts state courts will be continually by-
passed for federal courts, as has recently occurred in both Alabama 
and Massachusetts. It seems ironic that individuals who claim an in-
fringement of their constitutional rights within the state domain of 
public education will be obliged to abandon the state forum for asser-
tion of those rights. 
RICHARD D. GLOVSKY 
64 Mailloux v. Kiley, 436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1971). 
65 Id. at 566. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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§11.12. Increased sentence on appeal: Walsh v. Commonwealth.l 
The petitioner was indicted on three counts for armed robbery. After 
pleading guilty he was sentenced by the Middlesex Superior Court to 
concurrent terms on each indictment of not less than 5 nor more than 
10 years. Pursuant to the statutory provisions of Massachusetts,2 the 
petitioner appealed his sentence to the Appellate Division of the Su-
perior Court. Thereupon, without stating any reason, the Appellate 
Division increased one count of the sentence to a term of not less than 
8 nor more than 12 years. 
On appealing this increase to the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, the petitioner argued first that his constitutional guaran-
tee against being placed in double jeopardy was violated, and second 
that he was denied due process of law. That Court HELD: "[T]hat 
neither the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment nor the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated either 
by increasing the petitioner's sentence or by increasing it without 
stating the reasons therefor."3 
The question raised by this decision is whether the appellate courts 
in Massachusetts should continue to increase a petitioner's sentence in 
light of recent trends in the law which would favor a curtailment of 
that practice. An alternate question is whether the appellate courts 
should be allowed to increase the sentence only when stating a jus-
tification for so doing. In determining the answer, the most significant 
arguments raised by the petitioner, double jeopardy and due process, 
will be examined. Another argument frequently raised in this type 
of case, that of equal protection, will also be considered. After exam-
ining how different courts have resolved these constitutional issues, it 
will be concluded that it is appropriate to make the first sentence 
given by a trial court the ceiling for all sentences on subsequent ap-
peals. 
Before reaching the constitutional issues, it should be noted that 
the current interest in this area of the law is of recent origin. A trend 
is emerging which would restrict a court from arbitrarily granting an 
increase in sentence. Some courts now require that reasons be given 
for an increased sentence.4 
Perhaps what has provided the greatest impetus for the courts' con-
sideration of the problem of increased sentencing, as indicated by the 
number of times it has been cited, was a law review article written in 
1965 by Professor William W. Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: 
Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant.5 In the 
article, Van Alstyne pointed out that harsher sentences upon recon-
§11.12. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1315, 260 N.E.2d 911. 
2 G.L., c. 278, §§28A-28D. 
a 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1315, 1322, 260 N.E.2d 911, 916. 
4 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); United States v. Coke, 404 
F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968). 
5 74 Yale L.J. 606 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne]. 
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viction were permissible throughout the federal court system and in 
most of the states. He gave reasons why he felt this was unjust, basing 
his rationale on constitutional theories of double jeopardy, due process 
and equal protection. He concluded that the first sentence given 
should be the ceiling on any subsequent resentencing, provided the 
first sentence was within statutory limits.6 Since publication of this 
article in 1965, many courts, including the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit,7 have assimilated his views and rationales. However, the 
state courts in Massachusetts have yet to be convinced. 
In most decisions reflecting partial or full acceptance of Van Al-
styne's theories, the same constitutional issues have appeared. The 
first of these issues is double jeopardy. As stated in Patton v. North 
Carolina,8 the theory of double jeopardy involves three separate rules, 
which prohibit "(I) reprosecution for the same offense following 
acquittal; (2) reprosecution for the same offense following conviction; 
and (3) multiple punishment for the same offense."9 All courts rec-
ognize that one can be reprosecuted despite double jeopardy provi-
sions if the first conviction is overturned for constitutional or 
procedural reasons. The double jeopardy protection is . against un-
reasonable reprosecution. 
The guarantee against double jeopardy is a concept which has been 
written into our Federal Constitution10 and into state statutes.n 
. . . The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at 
least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the 
State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to 
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged 
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and 
ordeal, and compelling him to live in a continuing state of 
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that 
even though innocent he may be found guilty.12 
The Supreme Court has long allowed an increase in sentence upon 
a reconviction. The protection against receiving a second punishment 
for the same offense was expounded in Ex parte Lange.l3 Later it 
6 Professor Van Alstyne closed by saying: "The contention is, rather, that in all 
cases an original operative sentence within statutory limits and free of error 
prejudicial to the government must be regarded as a ceiling in any subsequent pro-
ceeding on the same offense, where the second trial is occasioned by a successful 
challenge to the original proceeding on constitutional grounds." ld. at 61 I. 
7 Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (lst Cir. 1967). 
8 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967). 
9 Id. at 643-644. 
10 U.S. Const. amend. V: "nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " 
11 G.L., c. 263, §§7-8A. No provision concerning double jeopardy is found in 
the Massachusetts constitution or the amendments thereto. 
12 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957). 
13 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). "If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence 
of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for 
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was stated that the prohibition in the double jeopardy clause did not 
relate to "being twice punished, but against being twice put in 
jeopardy ... ,"14 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court emphasized 
the point that one who appeals his conviction and wins can not use 
his previous jeopardy as a bar to subsequent retrial.111 In 1919, this 
policy was further cemented in.to law by the case of Stroud v. United 
States.l6 That case pointed out that the protection against double 
jeopardy related only to a second trial for the first offense. However, 
if the one convicted initiated an appeal which resulted in a reversed 
verdict, he would be considered to have "wiped the slate clean." Then, 
when a new trial was held, there would be no violation of double 
jeopardy within the meaning of the Constitution. 
A landmark case was Green v. United States,U in which a defendant 
was found guilty of second-degree murder but had his conviction re-
versed. He was tried again and convicted of first-degree murder, 
which carried with it the death penalty. His successful appeal of his 
second conviction, on the theory of double jeopardy, established the 
principal that a conviction of a lesser degree of a crime precludes 
conviction of a higher degree on retrial. 
The most recent pronouncement, and one on which great weight 
has been placed by petitioners and by the Supreme Judicial Court 
in the instant case, is North Carolina v. Pearce.1B That decision re-
affirmed the old proposition that "neither the double jeopardy pro-
vision nor the Equal Protection Clause imposes an absolute bar to 
a more severe sentence upon reconviction."lD 
The federal courts are divided when it comes to the double jeop-
ardy question. The First and Fourth Circuits prohibit an increase in 
punishment, while the Second, Third, Sixth and Seventh allow it. 
The major cases prohibiting an increase are Marano v. United States2o 
the same offence. And ... there has never been any doubt of ... [this rule's] 
entire and complete protection of the party when a second punishment is pro-
posed in the same court, on the same facts, for the same statutory offence. . . . 
[T]he Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice 
punished for the same offence as from being twice tried for it." Id. at 168, 173. 
14 United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896). 
liS Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 166 (1900). 
16 251 u.s. 15 (1919). 
17 355 u.s. 184 (1957). 
18 395 u.s. 7ll (1969). 
19 Id. at 723. But see Justice Harlan (concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
in the same case: "I therefore conclude that, consistent with the Fifth Amend-
ment, a defendant who has once been convicted and sentenced to a particular 
punishment may not on retrial be placed again in jeopardy of receiving a greater 
punishment than was first imposed." Id. at 751. Accord, Justice Douglas (concurring) 
in the same case: "It is my view that if for any reason a new trial is granted and 
there is a conviction a second time, the second penalty imposed cannot exceed 
the first penalty, if respect is had for the guarantee against double jeopardy." Id. 
at 726-727. 
20 374 F.2d 583 (lst Cir. 1967). 
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and Patton v. North Carolina.21 In Patton the court could see no 
constitutionally significant distinction between the prohibition against 
increasing sentences once service has begun and an increase in 
punishment after retrial.22 In Marano the court felt that even though 
new evidence had been given on retrial, it would not be permissible 
to increase the defendant's sentence. The court continued: "We think 
that there must be repose not merely as to the severity of the court's 
view, but as to the severity of the crime."23 
The Third Circuit took issue with Marano and concluded that in 
the federal system, when a new trial is ordered, the trial judge may 
impose a sentence greater than the one vacated, without giving any 
reasons for so doing.24 The Second Circuit agreed: 
... No policy of the double jeopardy clause is offended when, 
as a consequence of a retrial of the same offense resulting from 
proceedings taken by the accused to correct trial error, a higher 
punishment is imposed.25 
It was only as recently as 1969 that the double jeopardy clause of the 
Fifth Amendment was declared to embody "a fundamental ideal in 
our constitutional heritage,"26 and was applied to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.27 Shortly before this decision, several 
states began to prohibit increased sentences on appeal. Some cases are 
based on double jeopardy grounds,2s while others find their rationale 
in other principles.29 There are still those jurisdictions which find 
that imposing harsher penalties upon a second sentencing does not 
violate the double jeopardy clause.3° For example, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court in Kohlfuss v. Warden of Connecticut State Prison 
held that "the plaintiff was not put in double jeopardy, that due 
process of law was not denied to him, and that the heavier sentence 
imposed on him under the statutes was constitutionally valid.''31 
It is statutorily both permissible and proper for the appellate courts 
in Massachusetts to increase or decrease· the sentence of one who ap-
21 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967). 
22 Id. at 645. 
23 374 F.2d 583, 585 (1st Cir. 1967). 
24 United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1967). 
25 United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836, 841 (2d Cir. 1968). 
26 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). 
27 Ibid. 
28 People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963); 
People v. Ali, 66 Cal. 2d 277, 424 P.2d 932, 57 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1967). 
29State v. Turner, 247 Ore. 301, 429 P.2d 565 (1967); State v. Wolf, 46 N.J. 301, 
216 A.2d 586 (1966). 
30 Reeves v. State, 3 Md. App. 195, 238 A.2d 307 (1968), in which it was said: 
"The Court of Appeals of Maryland has consistently held that the imposition of 
a sentence at the second trial which results in a greater period of confinement .•. 
is not unlawful." Id. at 202, 238 A.2d at 312. See Kohlfuss v. Warden of Connecticut 
State Prison, 149 Conn. 692, 183 A.2d 626, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 928 (1962). 
31 Id. at 698, 183 A.2d at 629. 
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peals.a2 To facilitate appeals, an Appellate Division of the Superior 
Court was established with safeguards appropriate to ensure a peti-
tioner's receiving a fair disposition.ss The Appellate Division's only 
purpose is to review sentences and attempt to correct those which are 
extremely harsh or lenient.34 If leave to appeal is granted, the Ap· 
pellate Division may or may not conduct a hearing, but under no 
circumstances will it increase a sentence without giving the petitioner 
an opportunity to be heard.B5 The Massachusetts statute, unlike those 
of some other states, clearly provides that any time already served on 
an appealed sentence shall count toward a substituted sentence.36 
However, of the states which afford review, most do not allow an in-
crease in sentence.s7 
Massachusetts traces its double jeopardy policy to United States v. 
Baz,ss and Murphy v. Massachusetts.s9 It also relies heavily on Hicks v. 
Commonwealth,40 in which it was held that when a defendant has 
his prior conviction set aside on his appeal and is reconvicted, a 
longer sentence than initially imposed would not be objectionable. 
32 G.L., c. 278, §§28A·28D. 
33 Relevant parts of G.L., c. 278, §28A are as follows: "There shall be an ap· 
pellate division of the Superior Court for the review of sentences to the state 
prison imposed by final judgments in criminal cases, except in any case in which 
a different sentence could not have been imposed, and for the review of sentences 
to the reformatory for women for terms of more than five years imposed by final 
judgments in such criminal cases. Said appellate division shall consist of three 
justices of the Superior Court to be designated from time to time by the chief justice 
of said court, and shall sit in Boston or at such other place as may be designated 
by the chief justice, and at such times as he shall determine." 
34 Eighteenth Report of Mass. Judicial Council, Dec. 1942, Pub. Doc. No. 144 at 
28-30. It should be noted that an appeal to the Appellate Division is supplementary 
to any appeal a defendant may wish to take to the Supreme Judicial Court. Either 
or both types of appeal may be pursued. 
35 Relevant parts of G.L., c. 278, §28B are as follows: "If leave to appeal is 
granted in accordance with this section, the appellate division shall have jurisdic-
tion to consider the appeal with or without a hearing, review the judgment so 
far as it relates to the sentence imposed, and also any other sentence imposed 
when the sentence appealed from was imposed, notwithstanding the partial execu-
tion of any such sentence, and shall have jurisdiction to amend the judgment by 
ordering substituted therefor a different appropriate sentence or sentences or 
any other disposition of the case which could have been made at the time of the 
imposition of the sentence or sentences under review, but no sentence shall be in-
creased without giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard. If the appellate 
division decides that the original sentence or sentences should stand, it shall dis-
miss the appeal." 
36 G.L., c. 278, §28C. 
37 ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Advisory Com-
mittee on Sentencing and Review, Standards Relating to Appellate Review of 
Sentences (Tent. Draft 1967) rhereinafter cited as 1967 Advisory Committeel- The 
four states that do permit an increase are Maryland, Connecticut, Maine and 
Massachusetts. Id. at 55. 
38 163 u.s. 662 (1896). 
39 177 u.s. 155 (1900). 
40 345 Mass. 89, 185 N.E.2d 739 (1962). 
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The reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court was that once the peti-
tioner's prior conviction had been set aside by his appeal, he could 
not claim constitutional protection against double jeopardy. That 
Court reaffirms this rationale in Walsh. 
Most of the cases in the area of increased sentences deal with ap-
peals of conviction which result in a new trial and thus a new sentence. 
However, the situation can be treated the same whether the second 
sentence comes after a retrial or after an Appellate Division decision. 
The Court stated in Hicks: "We are of opinion that when a convicted 
defendant resorts to the statutory procedure prescribed by §§28A-28D 
for review of a sentence he assumes the same risks inherent in an appeal 
from a conviction."41 
There is no provision in the Federal Constitution or laws that re-
quires a state to have a system for appellate review, nor has the Su-
preme Court of the United States required this. That Court and others 
have held that once channels of appellate review have been estab-
lished, "the state must refrain from placing unreasonable restrictions 
on access."42 To accept the benefits of appellate review, one does not 
have to forfeit other protected rights: "Enjoyment of a benefit or pro-
tection provided by law cannot be conditioned upon the 'waiver' of a 
constitutional right."43 Therefore, to conclude the double jeopardy 
argument, it should be noted that since the state of Massachusetts, 
through its statutes, has provided a channel of appeal for Walsh, he 
does not have to waive any rights to take advantage of that channel. 
Walsh's second major argument on appeal was that his right of due 
process of law was violated by the unexplained increase of sentence.44 
The Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that, if indeed it were a re-
quirement to announce reasons for increasing a sentence, the purpose 
of such a rule would be to protect the petitioner from the vindictive-
ness of the judicial system or of one judge in particular. The peti-
tioner in Massachusetts is protected from the latter possibility by 
reason of the statute regulating appeals procedure, which states: "[N]o 
justice shall sit or act on an appeal from a sentence imposed by him."45 
The Court then discussed statistics showing the small percentage of in-
creased sentences in the years 1964-1969, which it felt negated the 
charge of vindictiveness in the system. Finally the Cour-t inferred that 
since North Carolina v. Pearce46 might require a specific charge of 
vindictiveness, the fact that it was not made supported the conclusion 
that no violation of due process occurred. 
41 Id. at 91, 185 N.E.2d at 740-741. 
42 Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353, 356 (lst Cir. 1969). Accord, Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
43 Moon v. Maryland, 250 Md. 468, 471, 243 A.2d 564, 566 (1968), citing Patton 
v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967). 
44 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1315, 1319, 260 N.E.2d 911, 914-915. 
45 G.L., c. 278, §28A. 
46 395 u.s. 71 l (1969). 
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North Carolina v. Pearce is the leading case and most recent pro-
nouncement by the Supreme Court in this area. This was a case in 
which the defendant had his original conviction overturned on consti-
tutional grounds. Upon being reconvicted he was resentenced to a 
term longer than his original sentence, with time already served being 
credited to his new sentence. The Court was concerned with possible 
vindictiveness on the part of courts in such situations, and especially 
with the appearance of any vindictiveness. The Court concluded: 
In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, ... when-
ever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant 
after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affrmatively 
appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information 
concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant oc-
curring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And 
the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based 
must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legiti-
macy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on ap-
peal.47 
Federal courts have not been quick to dismiss the due process argu-
ment.4S In Patton, the Fourth Circuit held that a sentence imposed at 
a second trial which increased punishment was unconstitutional be-
cause it violated due process and equal protection. ''Even the ap-
pearance of improper motivation is a disservice to the administration 
of justice."49 The petitioner should not have even the slightest fear 
that his appeal will result in the imposition of a direct penalty. 5° Agree-
ment is found in a case which, however, supports an increased punish-
ment. 51 That case stated that if there were any evidence that an in-
creased punishment had been given "because of the defendant's having 
prosecuted a successful appeal or other post-conviction remedy,"52 
then this would be a denial of due process of law. 
The rule adopted in Pearce- requiring affirmative reasons to in-
crease sentence- had been advocated in prior state cases, especially 
State v. ]acques.53 In jacques it was said that there was justification in 
law for a court to assess its sentence on the basis of facts which oc-
47 Id. at 726. But see Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155, 158 (1900): "And 
we have repeatedly decided that the review by an appellate court of the final 
judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offense of which the accused is 
convicted, is not a necessary element of due process of law, and that the right of 
appeal may be accorded by the State to the accused upon such conditions as the 
State deems proper." 
48 Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967); Marano v. United States, 
374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967). Contra, Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 
1969); United States ex rei. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1967). 
49 Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 641 (4th Cir. 1967). 
50 Marano v. United States, 347 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967). 
51 United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968). 
52 Id. at 842. 
53 99 N.J. Super. 230, 239 A.2d 252 (1968). 
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curred subsequent to the first sentencing.54 While not requiring 
affirmative reasons, State v. Stafjord55 held that any evidence concern-
ing a defendant's conduct, character and propensities should be con-
sidered whether it appears during the trial or in a presentence report. 
There is no case which specifically requires a charge of vindictive-
ness to be lodged against the sentencing judge in claiming a due 
process violation. In fact it has been suggested that "it is an impossible 
task for the prisoner to prove improper motivation of the trial 
judge."56 Equally impracticable and most distasteful would be an at-
tempt by a federal court to ascertain whether vindictiveness played a 
part in a sentencing judge's motives.57 If one accepts the premise that 
it would be nearly impossible to prove such a charge, then it follows 
that it would only be a useless maneuver to make the charges. It is 
generally agreed by appellate courts that a trial judge should be free 
to impose any sentence (within statutory and constitutional limits) 
that he deems appropriate at the time.58 However, in dealing with 
human judges, there is always the possibility that a vindictive de-
cision will be meted out. Therefore, to eliminate even the suggestion 
of impropriety, it has been concluded: "In order to prevent abuses, 
the fixed policy must necessarily be that the new sentence shall not 
exceed the old."59 
The third constitutional argument, raised in other cases chal-
lenging increased sentences, is based on the theory of equal protection. 
The courts currently apply the equal protection clause by recognizing 
the existence of classes of people. They hold that all members of the 
class must be treated equally. Everyone in the class of convicted per-
sons is protected from retrial and resentencing until his sentence is 
vacated.60 Any right or privilege granted to that class "must be ap-
plied equally and indiscriminately."61 
However, some courts reason that when prisoners appeal, it can be 
determined that a new class- that of appellants- has been formed. 
Then, as long as the law applies uniformly to this class, there is no 
violation of equal protection. They recognize the right of the prisoner 
to appeal. It has been stated that the right is not absolute and that 
the state can exert a "chilling effect" on the right for the advancement 
54 Id. at 242, 239 A.2d at 259. 
55 274 N.C. 519, 526, 164 S.E.2d 371, 376 (1968). 
56 Moon v. Maryland, 250 Md. 468, 472, 243 A.2d 564, 566 (1968), citing Patton 
v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967). 
57 Ibid. 
58 State v. Stafford, 274 N.C. 519, 531, 164 S.E.2d 271, 380 (1968). 
~9 Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 641 (4th Cir. 1967). Contra, State v. 
Stafford, 274 N.C. 519, 529, 164 S.E.2d 371, 378 (1968): "A rule that a new sentence 
can never exceed the old could cause such disparity in punishment at the same 
term of court as to create a festering sense of injustice in a prisoner and confuse 
the public." 
so Id. at 535, 164 S.E.2d at 382-383. 
61 Ibid. 
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of legitimate state interests.62 The "chill" is effected by removing the 
convicted person from a protected class to another class in which 
there are risks of a harsher sentence. However, the prisoner would 
still enjoy the equal protection of the law as applied to his new class. 
The contrary argument is that in the interest of fairness the class 
known as prisoners should not be further subdivided. A convict who 
appeals should not be forced to run a greater risk than one who does 
not. It is obvious that under the present Massachusetts law only those 
who pursue a postconviction remedy run the risk of being affected 
by increased sentences.63 The original sentences of those who do not 
appeal are just as likely to warrant review as the sentences of those 
who do, but the risk involved appears to be a substantial impediment 
to appeal.64 The result is that the pursuit of postconviction remedies 
is frustrated.6o 
In order to become a member of the class subject to a harsher sen-
tence, a prisoner must discover either a constitutional defect or a pro-
cedural error in his first trial. Then he must win a reversal. Upon 
reconviction he becomes eligible for a more severe sentence. Ironically, 
the only way a prisoner can receive a harsher sentence is by having 
the state admit he was initially denied a fair trial.66 
It seems that those who receive the lenient sentences, such as plea-
bargainers, do not bother to appeal.67 Using the Supreme Judicial 
Court's own statistics, it is notable that the number of appellants 
whose sentences are reduced is more than four and one-half times as 
great as those whose sentences are increased.68 This implies that of 
those whose sentences are affected by appeal, the great majority have 
valid grounds for reduction of sentence. It should not be assumed that 
those who do not appeal have no grounds for reduction, or feel that 
they have no grounds. "The fact remains that, in certain cases, a de-
fendant who has good ground for appeal will be dissuaded from appeal 
because of the possibility of receiving a greater sentence .... "69 It is 
the proper function of the court to be vigilant to protect access. to 
remedies, rather than to conceive doctrines which inhibit the exercise 
of the right to review.7o 
62 Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353, 356 (1st Cir. 1969). 
63 Van Alstyne, note 5 supra, at 638. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 643 (4th Cir. 1967). 
66 Ibid. 
67 Van Alstyne, note 5 supra, at 622. 
68 Walsh v. Commonwealth, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1315, 1320, 260 N.E.2d 911, 915 
n.4. 
69 Note, 50 Va. L. Rev. 559, 564 (1964). Accord, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 
U.S. 711, 746 (1969) Gustice Harlan concurring in part and dissenting in part): 
"[T~e pet!tioner's] decision whether or not to appeal would be burdened by the 
consideration that success, followed by retrial and conviction, might place him 
in a far worse position than if he remained silent and suffered what seemed to 
him an unjust punishment." 
70 Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 643 (4th Cir. 1967). 
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Thus far the constitutional arguments concerning increased punish-
ment on retrial or appeal have been discussed. It is apparent that 
there are many divergent opinions on this subject in the courts of 
this country.71 It is also evident that in the reasoning of those favor-
ing increased punishments, strong emphasis is placed upon the fact 
that the defendant initiated the action himsel£.72 Professor Van Al· 
styne disputes this reasoning, saying that if one "can waive protec-
tion" or "must so waive" in order to appeal, then this is a denial that 
the "protection is absolute" or an admission that one "can be required 
to forfeit a constitutional right to absolute protection" as a prerequi-
site to securing the privilege of appeal.73 In a partially concurring 
opinion in Pearce, Justice Harlan said: "In relying on this conceptual 
fiction [slate wiped clean after first sentence overturned], the majority 
forgets that Green v. United States, supra, prohibits the imposition of 
an increased punishment on retrial precisely because convictions are 
usually set aside only at the defendant's behest and not in spite of 
that fac;t."74 Since the defendant must initiate an appeal, he cannot 
be penalized by losing any of his constitutional rights. 
As a matter of policy, some states feel that they have a legitimate 
interest in retaining the power to increase sentences as well as to de-
crease them. These states fear a heavy administrative burden, were 
this provision to be relaxed. They envision an enormous number of 
frivolous appeals by petitioners who feel that they have nothing to lose. 
This legitimate state purpose has prevented the practice from being 
declared unconstitutional. However, in those jurisdictions where 
harsher resentencing is forbidden, there appears to have been no undue 
administrative burden.75 Harsher sentencing on appeal is forbidden in 
California and Virginia, in our military courts, in Germany,76 and 
71 The following synopsis which divides lines of opinion on increasing sentences 
is found in State v. Stafford, 274 N.C. 519, 523-524, 164 S.E.2d 371, 374-375 (1968): 
"I. Severer sentences are permissible and will be upheld unless they clearly 
flout constitutional standards of due process, and the judge need not articulate 
the reason for the differentiation in the sentence. [Citations omitted.] 
"2. Increased sentences are absolutely prohibited. [Citations omitted.] 
"3. Increased sentences are prohibited unless events warranting an increased 
penalty occur and come to the court's attention subsequent to the first sentence, 
and are made affirmatively to appear. [Citations omitted.] 
"4, Increased sentences are permitted when the record affirmatively shows that 
the judge is not penalizing the defendant for having exercised his right to have 
his first sentence vacated. [Citations omitted.] 
"5. After a defendant has been tried and convicted of murder in the first 
degree (or other capital crime), with a recommendation of life imprisonment, upon 
a retrial the prosecution may not seek the death penalty. [Citation omitted.]" 
72 Kohlfuss v. Warden of Connecticut State Prison, 149 Conn. 692, 183 A.2d 626, 
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 928 (1962). 
73 Van Alstyne, note 5 supra, at 627. 
74 395 u.s. 7ll, 749 (1969). 
75 Van Alstyne, note 5 mpm. at 618 n.33. 
76 Ibid. 
63
O'Reilly: Chapter 11: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1970
302 1970 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §11.12 
(after a 60-year experiment allowing increased punishments) in En· 
gland.77 
A petitioner with perfect grounds of appeal is now equally as de-
terred from seeking appellate review as one whose appeal rests on friv-
olous grounds.7s It seems a fundamental principal of American justice 
that if even one man is deterred from exercising his constitutional or 
statutory rights, then policy should be changed, if possible, to remove 
the deterrent. In practice the courts have tended to be pragmatic, 
concluding that the possibility of an administrative burden bars the 
full implementation of constitutional rights. However, jurisdictions 
which have prohibited increased sentences are not unduly burdened. 
Therefore, it should be incumbent upon all other jurisdictions to at 
least experiment with this rule for a period of time. 
Justice Douglas has said: "The theory of double jeopardy is that a 
person need run the gauntlet only once."79 Professor Van Alstyne 
also was of the opinion that a person should be subjected to the gaunt-
let only once, as to both conviction and punishment. He proposed a 
rule limiting punishment and gave a summary of the technical argu-
ments for applying the rule . 
. . . When a particular penalty is selected from a range of penal-
ties prescribed for a given offense, and when that penalty is im-
posed upon the defendant, the judge or jury is impliedly "acquit-
ting" the defendant of a greater penalty .... Thus, the range of 
penalties applicable to a given offense would be treated for double 
jeopardy purposes just the same as the range of degrees for a given 
offense. Failure to impose a higher penalty, like a failure to find 
guilt of a higher degree, would amount to an acquittal of that 
degree of punishment. At that point, double jeopardy protection 
from retrial for the same offense (or for the same degree of punish-
ment) of which one has previously been acquitted would take 
hold: The defendant could still be retried and punished for the 
offense and up to the degree of punishment of which he was 
originally convicted, or course, because he "waived" his double 
jeopardy protection by appealing his conviction. He could not be 
retried for a greater offense or a greater punishment} however, for 
he obviously had not appealed from his implied acquittal of such 
offense or punishment and consequently cannot be said to have 
waived the protection provided by that acquittal.so 
Professor Van Alstyne received a great deal of support from the 
ABA Advisory Committee on Sentencing and Review. After examin-
ing the problem of increased sentences, the committee concluded that 
77 1967 Advisory Committee, note 37 supra} at 62·63, discussing the British 
Criminal Appeal Act §4(2) (1966). 
78 State v. Wolf, 46 N.J. 301, 310, 216 A.2d 586, 591 (1966). 
79 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 727 (1969). 
80 Van Alstyne, note 5 supra} at 635. 
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because the power to increase sentences is exercised infrequently by 
authorized courts, it is not very effective in remedying overly lenient 
sentencing.81 The committee suggested a new standard which was 
adopted by the ABA. 
On a remand for the purpose of resentencing an offender, no 
sentencing court should be empowered to impose a sentence 
which results in an increase over the sentence originally imposed.82 
As has been indicated, some courts have begun to implement this 
standard in their decisions,83 while others take the more moderate 
view that sentences may be increased if new facts are presented be-
fore the second sentencing.84 The Advisory Committee on Sentenc-
ing and Review does not believe that the latter is a good practice. 
Even if new facts warrant a heavier sentence, it is better to have a stan-
dard that is "prophylactic in effect, and easily administered," under 
which an increased sentence could not be given.85 
Viewed in the light of the complex constitutional arguments, varied 
decisions and recent suggestions, if Pearce can be applied retro-
spectively, it can be argued that the Supreme Judicial Court did 
violate petitioner Walsh's constitutional rights by not informing him 
of the reasons for increasing the sentence. It would be relatively 
simple for a court to comply with the rule and give reasons for an in-
creased sentence, if new facts seemed to warrant such a disposition. 
However, the underlying problem of discouraging appeals would 
not be solved. Defendants who have valid grounds for appeal, but 
know that their record might cause a harsher sentence, or who might 
have had a disciplinary problem in prison, would be afraid to come 
forward. Since there is no way a defendant can correct what he feels is 
an inequity of justice without appealing either the case or (where al-
lowed) the sentence, it places a heavy burden on such a defendant to 
decide his course of action. Justice is not served when men fear to 
use judicial proceedings, while they feel in good faith that they have 
a valid argument for reduction in sentence. 
The last impediment to a change of policy is the need for an appro-
priate constitutional basis of decision, in lieu of rewriting statutes. 
Courts in other states have managed to sidestep the constitutional 
issue entirely by deciding the question on procedural grounds. One 
such court stated: "We hold that as a matter of judicial policy such a 
81 1967 Advisory Committee, note 37 supra, at 59. 
82Jd. at 55, §3.4(b). 
83 Paroutian v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); State v. Holmes, 
281 Minn. 294, 161 N.W.2d 650 (1968). 
84 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); State v. Stafford, 274 N.C. 519, 
164 S.E.2d 371 (1968). 
85 ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Advisory Com-
mittee on Sentencing and Review, Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies 
96 (Tent. Draft 1967). 
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sentence is improper."S6 Another court gave a more precise reason 
for its decision: 
We do not find it necessary to decide the constitutional issues 
as we conclude that when the state grants a criminal appeal as a 
matter of right to one convicted of a crime, as it has, our pro-
cedural policy should be not to limit that right by requiring the 
defendant to risk a more severe sentence in order to exercise that 
right of appeal.87 [Emphasis added.] 
The courts now have a viable option for circumventing the con· 
stitutional issues which have posed problems in the past. A policy of 
having the first sentence become a ceiling for future appeals is possible. 
A more thorough police investigation and presentence report, con-
taining all available factors regarding the crime and the accused, 
womd be stressed. Even if all relevant factors are not discovered, it 
is submitted that less harm is done to the integrity of the court and 
to the image of American justice if one who deserves a harsher 
sentence slips by with more lenient sentence (as do plea-bargainers 
now) than if one with a valid ground of appeal is afraid to exercise 
his constitutional rights. Any burden of increase in the number of 
appeals, unless clearly overwhelming, should be upon the courts, in 
the interest of more equitable treatment of appellants. 
TERRENCE J.. AHEARN 
86 State v. Holmes, 281 Minn. 294, 296, 161 N.W.2d 650, 652 (1968), in which 
the court held that "as a matter of law ... any increase in penalty upon a retrial 
inevitably discourages a convicted defendant from exercising his legal rights and 
is contrary to public policy." Id. at 298, 161 N.W.2d at 653. 
87 State v. Turner, 247 Ore. 301, 315, 429 P.2d 565, 571 (1967). 
66
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1970 [1970], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1970/iss1/14
